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1 Introduction
Over eight years Enron’s stock showed a slightly better performance than most other
big publicly listed companies in the U.S. represented in the S&P 500, however from 1999
to 2000 the stock value climbed up 150 percent whereas the index increased by only 10
percent only (Healy and Palepu, 2003).
Enron became extremely popular and one of the most admired U.S. corporations eternal-
ized in a corresponding list (Gordon, 2002). But soon crisis broke out culminating in the
company filing for bankruptcy (Gordon, 2002; Healy and Palepu, 2003). Investigations
following Enron’s breakdown showed that the actual performance did not reflect the pic-
ture presented in company reports but resulted from accounting fraud (Gordon, 2002).
Even though the company was navigating within the boundaries of regulations as all formal
requirements concerning the audit committee and control mechanisms were in compliance
with current legislation (Bratton, 2002). Managers were compensated with a compensa-
tion package that predominantly relied on stock-option plans (Healy and Palepu, 2003).
As a result managers extracted tremendous sums by selling their stock whereas employees
lost money they invested in the company believing it was secure (Gordon, 2002). Looking
at the corporate scandal there are three economic actors responsible for the disaster cre-
ated by Enron’s management, first there is the management itself and most importantly
the head-decision maker which is the CEO, then the board of directors and the audit com-
mittee as well as the compensation committee in charge of controlling and compensating
executives and then the auditor (Bratton, 2002; Healy and Palepu, 2003).
Soon other corporations followed the dreadful path of Enron. WorldCom even out-played
the former in earnings manipulation (Brickley, 2003). These two companies might be the
most prominent examples of corporate scandals in the United States, but they are by far
not the only ones. Shareholder activists, as well as institutional investors and legislative
authorities were outraged by the fact CEOs were able to extract rents and increase their
personal wealth even though they ruined their companies, exploited their employees and
betrayed their shareholders. The sheer possibility of fraud on such a big scale even though
both a board of directors and an audit committee were in office and in compliance with
corporate governance regulations, is baﬄing.
In this study the theoretical and empirical relationship between the board of directors,
audit committees, compensation committees and CEO compensation are assessed.
First the agency relationship will be explained as well as theories regarding CEO com-
pensation which in turn stem from agency theoretic assumptions, then an overview of
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alternative theories coping with executive compensation will be given, followed by a pre-
sentation of the CEO compensation package.
The next section analyzes the board of directors, after a summary describing the role
of the board a more detailed literature review about board composition will be given.
First the board of directors will be presented, followed by the audit and the compensation
committee, as they are the most important committees regarding CEO compensation.
This section encompasses the development of the hypotheses, later tested in the empirical
part. The next part deals with possible complications and problems associated with the
board of directors as a corporate governance mechanism. Here I pay close attention to the
potentially endogenous nature of these relationships. The theoretical part will be supple-
mented with and tested in empirical models. Beginning with data and variable description
and ending with the data analysis, the latter is composed of the descriptive analysis, the
correlation analysis and finally the multiple regression models. Again all of the analyses
will be conducted for the board of directors as well as for the audit and the compensation
committee.
This study concludes with an overview of the findings as well as a presentation of the
limitations and further research possibilities.
2 Executive Compensation
2.1 The Agency Relationship - Separation of Ownership and Control
Academic literature has long been concerned with the separation of ownership and con-
trol and implications thereof. According to Fama (1980) a shift from owner-managers
to professional executive decision-makers in the governance of large corporations is ob-
servable, resulting in incentive problems and opportunistic behavior conflicting with the
owner’s interests. As a result many theories across a myriad of academic disciplines deal-
ing with this issue evolved, one particularly worth mentioning is the Agency Theory.
The theoretical background of Agency Theory lies within the risk-sharing research of
the 1960’s and 1970’s where the focus is set on individual risk-attitudes and efficient
risk-allocation between cooperating parties. Additionally the agency theoretic research
string includes the so called “agency problem” that occurs when cooperating parties are
confronted with separation of ownership and control, different risk-attitudes as well as
diverging goals (Eisenhardt, 1989).
In order to formulate an agency problem one has to consider two cooperating economic
actors: the principal and the agent. The first figures as the owner of the firm (e.g. share-
holder) and the latter as person (e.g. CEO) acting on behalf and in the best interest of
the owner (Garen, 1994).
First of all one has to consider the individual risk preferences in this setting: The underly-
ing assumption in classical agency models is that the principal is risk neutral. Shareholders
who own the firm, usually consist of dispersed investors holding a diversified portfolio and
hence fit the role of a risk-neutral principal (Shavell, 1979). Agents are assumed to be
self-interested and risk averse, moreover they are considered rational actors with an aim
to maximize their utility (Stroh, Brett, Baumann, and Reilly, 1996).
As mentioned before, the principal in general terms delegates a task to the agent and
benefits from the outcome, shareholders are not the decision makers of a company, they
invest their personal financial resources and in turn expect dividend payments that max-
imize their wealth.
There are two possible situations: First, the task is perfectly observable and monitoring
is feasible, hence the principal exactly knows what action and effort level the agent chose
while fulfilling the delegated task. In this case compensation is based on input and directly
reflects the agent’s behavior (Bloom and Milkovich, 1998). Second, too many actions and
possible outcomes exist and the principal, due to high costs or complex tasks and envi-
ronmental influences, cannot observe the agent’s behavior directly (Baker et al., 1988). In
this situation it is impossible to base the agent’s compensation on input, the compensation
3
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function is tied to output which is quantifiable. Since executive work is very difficult to
define and to measure, it is the design of the compensation function which becomes the
crucial task of the principal (Lewellen et al., 1987).
Agents are rewarded based on certain performance measures, which in an ideal economic
world perfectly reflect the chosen input level. This first-best solution, which equals the
solution when behavior is perfectly observable, can be obtained if, and only if a perfor-
mance measure is congruent and noiseless. In practice, however, performance measures
are incomplete and noisy and hence can never capture the agent’s real effort. When per-
formance measures include noise, risk is imposed on the agent and a higher risk-premium
must be paid, resulting in higher compensation (Feltham and Xie, 1994).
Incentive systems can consist of financial performance measures (profits, cash-flows, ROA)
and non-financial measures (employee satisfaction). Most companies over-emphasize finan-
cial measures because they are easy to explain, even though they are unable to incorporate
long-term perspectives. The reason for gathering such financial measures is that they are
needed for annual reports and external parties like shareholders turn their focus to them
for evaluation. Ideally both dimensions should be integrated when evaluating performance
(Epstein and Manzoni, 1998).
Furthermore the compensation function can be based on objective performance indices
or subjective performance assessment (Baker et al., 1988; Gibbons and Murphy, 1989;
Gibbons, 1998).
Baker et al. (1988) in their work Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory criti-
cize objective performance measures as being sensitive to misspecification, thus distorting
incentives and motivating employees to shirk.
Imagine a manager who is rewarded based on a compensation function requiring profits to
increase each period (p0 < p1 < . . . < pt). According to the chosen depreciation method
one can manipulate the system and simulate increasing profits. The manager in this case
can extract bonus payments with constant or even decreasing performance by accounting
manipulation.
Gibbons (1998) states that in practice many firms use a combination of both objective
and subjective performance measures, which allows firms to benefit from the advantages
of an integrated compensation scheme. A subjective component could be the CEO’s hu-
man capital or his contribution to the sustainable value creation assessed by the board
of directors. These values might not be quantifiable or directly measurable but without
doubt are of essential interest to the company.
What all these different assessment criteria try to mitigate is a situation where CEOs
get paid for company performance which in turn is a resultant of environmental influ-
ences rather than CEO’s own performance. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) argue that
shareholders would not reward lucky CEOs but hard-working executives, who maximize
firm value by exerting high levels of effort to make the right decisions.
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2.2 CEO Compensation
Executive compensation is one of the most prominent mechanisms to minimize the costs
of the classic agency-relationship. The principal has to design a compensation-package
providing incentives to the CEO so that s/he acts in the firm’s best interest and at the
same time balances the risk imposed, even though the latter might have diverging private
interests and risk attitudes (Garen, 1994).
The rapid growth of CEO compensation in the last decades has raised public inter-
est in executive compensation as reflected by countless discussions in newspaper articles,
by shareholder activism and academic literature (Murphy, 1999; Bebchuk and Grinstein,
2005). Accounting scandals (Enron, WorldCom, and others) where managers’ wealth grew
and shareholders suffered enormous losses enraged shareholders, politicians as well as the
public, fueled fierce debates over CEOs’ paychecks and their justification.
Academic literature identified equity-based compensation components as the main source
of growth in executive compensation, this phenomenon can be observed at the CEO-level
as well as within the group of top-five-executives. Even the fixed base salary increased in
the period of 1993 - 2003 (Bebchuk and Grinstein, 2005). Hall and Murphy (2003) high-
light the explosion and recent cutback of rewarding executives as well as general workforce
with stock option plans as a new trend in pay practices.
Gabaix and Landier (2008) argue that the rise in CEO compensation can be traced back
to the differences in company size. The authors state that the massive increase of CEO
pay of 600% is attributed to the analogous increase in market capitalization. Market cap-
italization is increasingly being used as a size proxy in academic literature, according to
Murphy (1999).
Gabaix and Landier (2008) point out three approaches that attempt to identify the actual
reason for the massive increase in executive pay and particularly in CEO compensation:
perfect contracting, the skimming view and the idea that changes in the tasks result in
changes in compensation.
Under the perfect contracting view it is the role of the board to design the CEOs com-
pensation package in a manner that CEOs are motivated to act in line with shareholder
interests (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). This approach relies heavily on the incentives used
and their effect on the CEOs behavior. Even very high CEO compensation might be justi-
fiable and necessary depending on the risk imposed on the CEO, sometimes risk premiums
are not high enough and hence fail to cover the CEOs risk resulting in the rejection of
feasible and shareholder value maximizing projects. Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argue that
optimal contracts are obtained under the principle of arm’s length bargaining, otherwise
market constraints can prevent the CEO or the board from deviating from the perfect
contracting solution..
The skimming view tries to explain the change in executive pay that is not consistent
with the perfect contracting view. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) state that the sep-
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aration of ownership and control within this approach is believed to result in managerial
entrenchment, allowing the CEO to manipulate the board of directors and influence the
CEO pay-package. The authors argue that salary and bonuses as well as option plans are
designed in a way that luck is incorporated in the compensation function, and CEOs re-
ceive excessive payments. This highlights the idea that boards might not always represent
as effective shareholder protection as defined by corporate governance codices (Denis and
McConnell, 2003). Bebchuk and Fried (2003) point out that individual directors are pro-
posed by managers and shareholders vote within this slate. De facto in some cases boards
are designed by the executives they are supposed to monitor (Shivdasani and Yermack,
1999). The pay-setting process is not always carried out on arms-length’s bargaining, as a
result CEOs actually design their own compensation package (Bertrand and Mullainathan,
2001). However there are constraints to managerial rent-extraction, as directors have to
approve the CEO’s pay package (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Gabaix and Landier (2008)
state that the third possible reason for the rise in CEO pay is that the job has changed
dramatically over the years, and that this change results in an analogous increase in com-
pensation.
2.3 Alternative Theories of CEO Compensation
2.3.1 The Economic Approach - Human Capital Theory
Human capital theory deals with the multitude of decisions a human being has to
make (e.g. education, job opportunities) and defines them as investments which later
in life generate returns (Ben-Porath, 1967). The creation of human capital depends on
investments that result in new abilities and potential thus enabling the person to break
new ground and improve career opportunities (Coleman, 1988). According to Ben-Porath
(1967) it is the youth that invests in human capital in order to benefit from higher future
earnings, one can assess that wages are relatively low in the beginning of the career and
rising over time. Combs and Skill (2003) point out that more than half the amount
of variation in managerial compensation is explained by a few variables e.g. company
size and performance; whereas the other part remains unidentified. The authors argue
that superior executive skills like excellent education and extensive expertise result in a
competitive advantage and higher compensation. Harris and Helfat (1997) hypothesize
and empirically support that, all other things equal, more skilled internally recruited
CEOs receive higher compensation accounting for the superiority of their human capital.
Given strong boards and thus effective corporate governance mechanisms premium CEO
compensation reflects the board’s valuation of the CEO’s human capital as opposed to
weak, insider dominated boards that pay market-driven remuneration and fail to retain
strong talents (Combs and Skill, 2003).
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2.3.2 The Sociological Approach - Social Comparison
Social comparison describes the process of comparing others to oneself with the intention
of creating or updating one’s self-concept (Zell and Alicke, 2009).
O’Reilly et al. (1988) propose two influential factors on compensation design conducted by
committee members, first the comparison with themselves based on their experience and
expertise and second market comparison, where other CEOs are compared with the firm’s
CEO. Gibbons and Murphy (1989) argue that there are good reasons why CEOs should be
compensated on a relative basis, being risk-averse they should not be held responsible for
market or industry shocks, the effect of shocks can be alleviated by comparison with other
CEOs. Beside this approach it is common practice to achieve relative evaluation through
internal comparison; however Gibbons and Murphy (1989) highlight the shortcomings e.g.
CEOs choosing weak subordinates in order to seem more competent and assure one’s
position, as well as sabotage and collusion.
2.3.3 The Psychological Approach - Stewardship Theory
Davis et al. (1997) criticize the basic assumptions on which agency theory and the cor-
responding models are based. As explained earlier, the principal-agent theory considers
two economic actors that cooperate as the agent acts on behalf of the principal. When an
agency problem occurs diverging interests and different time and risk preferences play an
important role. Both actors are rational human beings and utility maximizers. According
to Davis et al. (1997) this is where the problem with the agency theoretic approach starts,
as humans are seldom acting completely rational whereas most models assume homo eco-
nomicus characteristics. As opposed to agency theory which dominated for many years
economic literature, stewardship theory is a more recent line of research that emerged in
the 1990’s (Wasserman, 2006). Davis et al. (1997) state that agency theory and stew-
ardship theory are not necessary rivaling theories, since the former is suited for situations
where diverging preferences can be mitigated by corporate boards and sophisticated design
of the compensation function whereas the later deals with different human actions depend-
ing on situational and psychological forces. Wasserman (2006) suggests stewardship theory
is superior in organizations build on trust and encouraging identification rather than on
monitoring mechanisms which induce control. Muth and Donaldson (1998) argue that
transferring power to the CEO is beneficial for company success since it meets the CEO’s
need for achievement and recognition and increases non-financial motivation. Stewards are
defined as economic actors with a collectivistic scope. Maximizing shareholders wealth si-
multaneously increases the steward’s own utility since it is strongly tied to company success
(Davis et al., 1997). Stewardship theory advocates different board structures than agency
theoretic models where independent boards are favored. Here insider domination is not a
sign of failing corporate governance but rather an efficient force since specialized insider
knowledge, company based expertise and dedication to the company represent success
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drivers (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). When setting CEO and top-executive compensation
boards would design a steward’s compensation function with a smaller fraction of base
salary as well as performance based compensation compared to those of agents, since the
former are motivated intrinsically driven by loyalty and identification with the company
(Wasserman, 2006).
2.4 The Design of the CEO’s Pay-Package
In practice one can observe considerable variation in pay-setting across companies. Com-
pensation packages are generally structured along four essential components. The standard
CEO pay-package contains a fixed salary, an annual bonus based on short-term targets,
stock options, and long-term oriented compensation e.g. restricted options or pension plans
(Murphy, 1999).
Since it is not conditioned on certain performance measures which have to be met by the
CEO the base salary is regarded fixed to a certain amount and riskless when compared with
variable compensation components. In a situation where the principal can easily observe
the agent’s actions (and thus information about the underlying effort-level is accurate),
fixed salaries are to be used (Bloom and Milkovich, 1998). However the exact effort level
of a CEO is hard to determine and hence fixed compensation will only constitute one part
of the CEO’s compensation function.
Although fixed, it does not imply that the salary-level is independent of the CEO’s per-
formance. According to Prendergast (1999) fixed salaries lack sufficient incentives due
to the missing link of pay to performance. Future contracts however depend on current
performance given that an individual can only renegotiate a contract in his favor, if certain
targets were met in the past period (Prendergast, 1999). Usually salaries are determined
at the beginning of the year and thus reflect last period’s performance (Hall and Lieb-
mann, 1998). A poorly performing CEO might weaken his bargaining position and hence
lose a substantial part of his fixed income in the following period, as opposed to a well
performing CEO who might be able to renegotiate his contract and raise his base salary
to a higher level.
Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) point out that base salaries, being cash compensa-
tion, lack incentives and the only way to create pay packages with incentive power is to
emphasize variable pay particularly stock-related compensation.
The variable part of a compensation package can consist of various incentive instruments;
each with its respective objectives and merits. Lewellen et al. (1987) argue that the aim
of this multitude of pay components is to mitigate existing conflicts between shareholders
and executives. According to the authors the problems of diverging temporal horizons and
differing risk attitudes can be solved with the help of corresponding current incentives as
opposed to deferred compensation and cash versus equity based compensation. Incentive
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mechanisms tend to be of either long-term or short-term nature.
The bonus part of the compensation package is usually based on annual performance
measures and hence is short-term oriented. The cash amount is calculated at the end
of the year, according to its weight in the compensation function, and is usually paid
out annually rewarding the CEO’s performance during the last fiscal period (Hall and
Liebmann, 1998).
As bonus payments are not tied to future performance their incentive power is limited to
a relative short span of time, shareholders in contrast depend on sustainable growth and
value creation.
Academic literature has emphasized the importance of tying executive pay to perfor-
mance. Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988) argue that empirical research shows only a
weak but statistically significant correlation between executive compensation and company
stock price development. The authors state that CEO’s own a far too small proportion of
company stock and hence lack incentive also shareholders’ wealth is barely tied to CEO
compensation. According to the authors an increase of stock value of 1000$ augments
CEO short-term compensation by 0.00002% (of 1000$). Political constraints in reaction
to public outrage about vast CEO compensation are one of the possible explanations why
certain contracts are not enforced. Another rater unlikely possibility is that the board
of directors can observe the CEOs actions in detail and hence a smaller proportion of
incentive pay is needed since monitoring accounts for most of the incentives (Jensen and
Murphy, 1990). In contrast Hall and Liebmann (1998) argue that pay-for-performance
sensitivity is much larger than stated by previous academic literature. Furthermore the
authors point out that this connection can easily be obtained with the use of equity based
forms of compensation e.g. CEO stock-holdings and granting stock options.
Since compensation in this case is a direct function of firm performance, CEOs will only
be rewarded if they meet certain stock price performance targets which are in line with
shareholders’ interest and at the same time increase the CEO’s wealth. Stock options
thus seem to be an effective way of tying CEO wealth directly to company performance
and thereby mitigating the existing agency problems between owners and managers (Hall
and Murphy, 2003). Compared to salaries equity based compensation components are
considered variable and are a rather risky form of compensation having a long-term and
future-oriented temporal focus.
3 Board of Directors and CEO Compensation
The substantial rise in CEO compensation has attracted the attention of academics as
well as politicians, shareholders and the public in general. After the well-known accounting
scandals involving big U.S. companies the board of directors is of special interest, as they
are partly to blame for the disasters. Denis and McConnell (2003) differentiate between
external and internal corporate government structures, the board of directors being part
of the internal corporate governance.
This internal control mechanism clearly failed considering the multiple cases of account-
ing fraud and earnings management, failures which shareholders had to pay for (Laux
and Laux, 2008). Nearly every corporation today is and shall be managed by a board of
directors as dictated by state law. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) emphasize that corpora-
tions as well as non-incorporated organizations like universities and hospitals are usually
controlled by boards, incorporation being legally impossible without the control mecha-
nism of boards. The board of directors is the most important control authority regarding
organizational decision-making (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983).
Academic literature suggests that the main function of the board is mitigating agency
conflicts caused by separation of ownership and control (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003).
The board’s key tasks include hiring, firing and monitoring executives as well as setting
their compensation function (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Denis and McConnell, 2003)
in a manner that adequate incentives are induced as the role of the board also requires
directors to act on behalf of the shareholders who elect the individual representatives to
the board. Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, and Dalton (1998) define the board of directors as
the most important protection system shareholders have against entrenched CEOs. The
authors identify excessive compensation as one of the possible problems shareholders face
and suggest that according to agency theoretic insights the board of directors should be
responsible for dealing with diverging interests of CEOs as well as mitigating these differ-
ences with appropriate compensation functions.
Coles, Naveen, and Naveen (2006) argue that the two critical tasks of the board of direc-
tors are monitoring and at the same time advising top executives in their daily business
decisions. Adams (2003) also emphasizes the board’s role as advisors and monitors and
additionally points out the importance of all stakeholders of the company, the third func-
tion being acting in the best interest of those stakeholders. Laux and Laux (2008) on the
other hand identify designing the CEO’s compensation scheme and overseeing financial
reporting as the board’s most important functions.
Daily et al. (1998) argue that executives, especially CEOs have an influence over the board
and thus board members are not really objective but align themselves with the CEO in-
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stead of acting in the best interest of shareholders. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) state
that the major role of the board is to provide management with information and advice,
furthermore future CEOs should be part of the board since this is where they can train
their future role and at the same time be assessed by experienced decision makers.
In practice one can differentiate a myriad of possible board structures, there are small vs.
big boards, boards with different subcommittees, boards can consist of outsiders, insiders
or affiliated directors, individual directors can sit on one or more boards at a time. All
these structural variables have an impact on the company, on firm performance and also
on the way how executives are monitored, advised and compensated. As mentioned before,
one of the boards’ most important tasks is setting the CEO’s compensation function. The
different variables represent proxies for corporate governance and hence the monitoring
ability of the board. This section looks at all the different possibilities of board composi-
tion, the relevant literature is reviewed as well as hypothesis concerning the influence of
board structure on CEO pay are developed.
3.1 Board structure
In this section all the relevant variables regarding the board of directors are presented,
following the respective blocks of literature review the hypothesis are stated.
3.1.1 Board Size
Board size is the number of individuals voted by shareholders to be a director on a
company’s board.
Board size is measured by the number of directors. Some boards consist of relatively
few directors, whereas other boards are composed of many directors. Empirical evidence
about board size is mixed, resulting in inconsistent guidelines for the optimal size.
Callahan, Millar, and Schulman (2003) come to the conclusion that large boards have
a negative impact on firm performance. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) come to the same
conclusion and argue that smaller boards are better decision-makers in general and most
important concerning executive compensation. Jiraporn, Singh, and Chun (2009) also find
a negative and significant effect of size on firm performance, based on EBIT. Ryan and
Wiggins (2004) argue that boards lose their independence the larger they are. A more
detailed analysis of Conyon and Peck (1998) reveals that there is a relationship between
the number of executive directors and CEO compensation. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker
(1999) conclude that large boards are inefficient and weak monitors. The authors state
that CEOs in companies with large boards receive higher compensation than those eval-
uated by smaller boards. Petra and Dorata (2008) find that CEOs receive lower fractions
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of performance based incentives when boards are small. Core et al. (1999) emphasize
and provide empirical evidence, that larger boards result in higher CEO compensation.
Yermack (1996) points out, that there is an inverse relationship between board size and
company value. Pathan (2010) tests the influence of board size on bank risk, and finds a
negative coefficient. Klein (2002) argues that larger boards result in a greater degree of
audit committee independence, which is an indicator for better monitoring. The author
states that if the board size is limited there are fewer directors who can serve on vari-
ous committees, in turn the degree of independence can decrease as there are not enough
outsiders available to sit on the committees. There seem to be different optimal sizes for
different firms; simple firms benefit from small boards, whereas complex firms with special
advising needs benefit from large boards with considerable outsider representation (Coles
et al., 2006). The authors hypothesize that small boards are better monitors compared
to large boards, however large boards represent better advisors to company management
since a broader knowledge-base is created at board level.
The negative effects of large boards can be mitigated and even completely off-set by the
use of subcommittees by alleviating the size-induced costs (Reeb and Upadhyay, 2010).
A large body of the academic literature seems to consider small boards more effective
as opposed to large boards, however companies have to cope with different environments
and in some cases quite the opposite is optimal. It seems that board size has decreased
recently as a reaction to SOX - Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (Coles et al., 2006). Based on
theoretical findings board size is expected to have a negative impact on corporate gover-
nance mechanisms and hence the coefficients regarding CEO compensation are expected
to be positive (Core et al., 1999).
H1: There is a positive relationship between board size and CEO compensation
3.1.2 Board Composition
Each individual director can be categorized, according to his relationship to the com-
pany, into one of the following groups: insiders, outsiders or gray directors. According to
academic literature, this is one of the most common approaches in categorizing directors
(Core et al., 1999; Anderson and Bizjak; Klein, 2006). Each of these groups has a special
role within the board and thus has a different influence on the company as a whole and
on CEO compensation.
Anderson and Bizjak differentiate between insiders, affiliated directors and independent
directors. Sometimes gray directors are referred to as being affiliated, but basically the
same independence status is meant. By “independent” the authors define a group usually
named as outsiders. However the term independent is not necessarily equivalent to this
of an outsider, under the corporate governance rules of the NYSE former employees and
their family members become independent three years after they end their employment
within the company.
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Insiders
Insiders are executives, retired executives or family members of the former two (Core et al.,
1999; Anderson and Bizjak). Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argue that insider dominated
boards are less effective. Insider representation on company boards is not per se a bad
solution, it depends why insiders are appointed to their seats if the appointment is based
on shareholder interests it can even be optimal (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997). In their
empirical work concerning stock-price reactions and insider appointments Rosenstein and
Wyatt (1997) distinguish two groups: insiders owning less than 5% stock and insiders
that own between 5% and 25%, in the first case the stock price reaction is significantly
negative, whereas in the second case the significant relation is positive. Klein (1998) is not
able to identity a significant linkage between company performance and the percentage
of insider representation on the board of directors. Yet this study reveals a positive
relationship between insider representation on finance- and investment committees and
firm performance, which leads to a conclusion that insiders are of great value to the
company when put on these committees due to their in-depth company knowledge and
professional expertise. Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas (2010) highlight the importance
of insiders and their information status compared to outsiders who suffer from a lack of
company based knowledge and hence have to obtain this information in order to improve
their decision-making. Callahan et al. (2003) argue, that directors are supposed to work
in the shareholders’ best interest by advising and counseling executives and thus helping
them making strategic decisions. The authors point out that in this situation executive
directors have a significant advantage over outsiders. Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990)
in their work argue in favor of inside directors as they are part of the internal decision-
making team and hence have better information about the CEO’s and other executives’
performance and effort levels. Core (Core et al., 1999) et al. (1999) find that the CEO
compensation is decreasing as the percentage of insiders appointed to the board is growing.
Anderson and Bizjak find that a greater fraction of insiders is positively associated with
CEO stock-ownership, hence tying CEO wealth closely to shareholder interests.
H2: CEO compensation is negatively related to insider representation on the board board
rises.
Gray Directors
Retired executives and relatives of former or current management as well as persons
with disclosed conflicting interests and interlocked directors all fall within the category of
gray directors (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). Gray directors are not truly independent
since they have further relationships to the company beside their directorship. Daily et al.
(1998) argue that executives are more likely to exert influence over gray directors than on
outsiders and that they might design less risky CEO compensation functions in favor for
the CEO. Core et al. (1999) find that CEO compensation increases as the number of gray
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members on the board increases and argue that they are less effective monitors and under
the influence of management.
H3: CEO compensation is a positive function of gray directors’ representation on the
company board.
Outsiders
A director is an outsider if sitting on the firm’s board is his only relationship to the
company; there exist no further blood or business relations between the director and the
company. A director who at the same time consults the company or works for a subsidiary
cannot be considered an outsider since his relationship with the firm exceeds pure direc-
torship. Generally academic literature identified outside directors as a defense mechanism
for shareholders, as they are believed to be independent from management and hence more
willing to combat an entrenched CEO who is maximizing his own wealth at the expense of
shareholders. In order to define the role and effects of outsider representation on company
boards different academic views will be presented.
Conyon and Peck (1998) examined an increase in non-executive directors in the period of
1991-1994, which can be traced back to the recommendations of the Cadbury and Green-
bury Committees.
However the authors’ findings imply that the fraction of non-employee directors has no
effect on executive compensation, the positive influence on company performance was
stronger and significant. Coles et al. (2006) argue that in complex firms a higher rep-
resentation of outsiders has a positive effect on performance by ameliorating the advice
capacity of the board. Opposed to the view that boards composed of a big majority of
outsiders are costly Reeb and Upadhyay (2010) argue that operating with subcommittees
off-sets this negative effect. More independent boards fearing a law-suit and being closely
monitored are believed to act conservative concerning bank-risk (Pathan, 2010). In their
empirical study Jiraporn et al. (2009) find that the group of busy directors is comprised
by 78% of outsiders, whereas the non-busy group shows a 17% lower contribution (61%) of
outsiders. The authors conclude that there is a higher demand for outsiders on the board,
than there is for insiders, they trace this development back to the outsiders’ role as crucial
objective advisors. Moreover non-busy outsiders are believed to perform as better moni-
tors and are more likely to fire the CEO after an unsuccessful period (Fich and Shivdasani,
2006). Duchin et al. (2010) cannot find any relation between adding more outsiders to a
board and firm performance on average, however they find that outsiders ameliorate per-
formance when obtaining information is cheap and decrease company performance when
information is costly. Moreover the authors argue that the optimal number of outsiders is
different for every company, they hypothesize that some companies have fewer outsiders
for optimality reasons and exogenously rising the number of outsiders hurts their perfor-
mance, whereas other firms seem to keep outsider representation low in order to facilitate
managerial entrenchment (Duchin et al., 2010). Ryan and Wiggins (2004) argue in favor of
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independent boards and emphasize the importance of outsiders as shareholder protection;
they find that shareholders’ interests are best managed by an outsider dominated board
whose compensation package is closely tied to shareholder wealth.
As mentioned before the design of a compensation function is crucial in setting the right
incentives and avoiding agency conflicts, which of course can occur between directors and
shareholders.
Peasnell, Pope, and Young (1998) find support for the use of outsiders on a company’s
board. The authors conclude that outsiders prevent executives from maximizing their com-
pensation by choosing the right accounting methods. Furthermore Peasnell et al. (1998)
argue that outsiders restrict management’s possibilities for all kind of earnings manage-
ment. Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) argue that outsiders are not an active part of the
daily decision-making process management has to face and hence have limited information
not just about what is best for the firm but also lack information about decision quality
and exerted effort of CEOs. The authors conclude that outsiders are not able to assess
executive performance due to these informational short-comings. Core et al. (1999) find
no evidence that the number of outsiders appointed to the board has any influence on
CEO compensation argue in disfavor of forced use of outsiders, even though some guide-
lines and shareholder activists ask for it. Boards tend to be more rigorous while fulfilling
their monitoring duties and optimal pay-performance-sensitivities are higher, when they
are more independent of CEOs (Ozerturk, 2005).
Outsiders are believed to be shareholder’s protection against opportunistic CEOs (Ryan
and Wiggins, 2004), moreover fulfilling their monitoring function they prevent execu-
tives from maximizing their compensation (Peasnell et al., 1998). However Baysinger
and Hoskisson (1990) argue that outsiders are not as well informed as insiders resulting
in suboptimal decisions. Literature as well as empirical results concerning outsiders is
ambiguous, many studies find no relationship between outsiders and CEO compensation.
H4: There is no relationship between outsiders and CEO compensation.
Old Outsiders Core et al. (1999) define directors to be old when they pass the age of
69, this is a definition commonly adopted and used by acThe authors hypothesize and
provide empirical evidence that old directors are less effective and that their appointment
to company boards results in higher CEO compensation. Petra and Dorata (2008) analyze
the effect of director age on their performance when placed onto the compensation com-
mittee, the authors hypothesize that ”old” directors might be captivated in old-fashioned
views and as a result the committee might become inflexible. However they were not able
to identify any effect of senior directors serving on the compensation committee on corpo-
rate governance (Petra and Dorata, 2008). Core et al. (1999) find support for a positive
relationship between CEO compensation and old directors..
H5: Old directors have a positive influence on CEO compensation.
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Busy Outsiders The public in general as well as private and institutional shareholders
are worried that busy directors lack time for effective and well-considered decision-making,
multiple directorship is regarded as an obstacle to successful monitoring and hence might
weaken a company’s corporate governance. Academic literature is ambivalent concerning
director busyness. Whereas some researchers argue that busy directors have a negative
effect on the quality of corporate governance (e.g. Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) others find
positive effects of busyness (Jiraporn et al., 2009).
Fama and Jensen (1983) state that the value of a director’s human capital is a function
of her/his directorships, as it depends on the quality of the decisions they make in var-
ious organizations. The authors argue that directors are keen to build a reputation as
decision-making experts; hence they use their directorships for signaling their abilities
and expertise. The number of board seats an executive occupies can be interpreted as a
classification figure of their expertise and their quality as decision-makers. Fich and Shiv-
dasani (2006) empirically support that outsiders connected to successful companies tend
to occupy more board seats as they are highly sought after in the directorship market.
Jiraporn et al. (2009) find that outside directors are busier than insiders, they attribute
this pattern to the fact that there is more demand for independent directors. The higher
demand for independent directors might be a result of the regulations imposed on public
corporations, since certain committees have to be composed by outsiders only e.g. the au-
dit committee more outsiders are needed to fill those committees. The authors also argue
that directors serving on boards of bigger firms are busier than their colleagues serving on
boards of small corporations since they seem to have more profound expertise and are in
high demand on the director market. Busy directors serve on bigger and at the same time
more independent boards than non-busy directors and also they tend to serve on more
committees (Jiraporn et al., 2009). The authors conclude that the reputation hypotheses
is significant and that expertise is signaled through the number of board seats held, they
empirically prove their prediction with the observation that directors holding more than
two board seats serve on more committees that the non-busy fraction of directors.
Core et al. (1999) define an employed outsider being busy, when serving on three or more
corporate boards and a retired outsider is considered busy when being on six or more
boards. The authors argue that busy directors have limited monitoring abilities and find
a positive relationship between director busyness and CEO compensation. Fich and Shiv-
dasani (2006) decide to use another approach than individual busyness in this context,
they examine the board as a whole and define a busy board to consist of a majority (50%
or more) of the outsiders that occupy three or more board seats. The authors show that
companies with busy boards perform inferior compared to non-busy boards, as well as
CEO turnover following poor performance is less likely, stock price reactions to busyness
are mostly negative whereas restructuring of the board resulting in non-busyness is fol-
lowed by positive reactions. Their study suggests that busy directors become preoccupied
and as a result cannot fulfill their monitoring duties as good as non busy directors hence
lowering the effectiveness of corporate governance. As a result some companies could ben-
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efit from a lower fraction of outsiders, if they are considered busy (Fich and Shivdasani,
2006). In contrast Ferris et al. (2003) find no evidence that multiple board seats held by
a director harm company performance, hence the busyness hypothesis has to be rejected.
Interestingly the authors were able to identify a positive link between company and board
size and the number of board appointments, this result is consistent with later findings
of (Jiraporn et al., 2009). The reputation hypothesis seems to hold for the sample as a
positive relation between firm performance and following appointments observed (Ferris
et al., 2003). Petra and Dorata (2008) show that performance based incentives are lower
when companies restrict their directors from serving on more than four boards. However
the authors argue that the connection between pay and performance is not strong enough
and are critical concerning incentive pay, e.g. stock-options.
One must keep in mind that higher incentive pay results in higher overall compensation,
but if shareholders’ interests and the CEO’s interests are aligned by the chosen compen-
sation functions and CEO compensation is strongly tied to company performance, high
incentive pay is beneficial for the company and helps alleviating agency conflicts. Song
and Windram (2004) highlight that director busyness contributes to a diligent audit com-
mittee and consequently to improved audit committee efficiency.
In accordance with prior literature (Core et al., 1999; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006) as well
as corporate governance guidelines busy directors are expected to have a positive influence
on CEO compensation.
H6: CEO compensation is a positive function of the fraction of busy outsiders serving on
the board of directors.
CEO appointed Outsiders Outside directors appointed by the CEO are considered
inefficient since they are influenced by the CEO and result in higher CEO compensation
(Core et al., 1999). Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) find that CEO’s are more likely to
appoint gray directors instead of independent outsiders. Furthermore the authors point out
that market reactions to outsider appointment to the boards show a negative coefficient,
when the CEO is involved in the nomination process. Additionally CEO’s tend to appoint
busy directors to the board. Callahan et al. (2003) find that CEO involvement in the
director nomination process and long-term company performance show a significant and
positive coefficient. Daily et al. (1998) argue that directors nominated by the CEO might
feel loyalty to the CEO and hence would be less ready to challenge management decisions.
H7: Directors appointed by the CEO have a positive influence on CEO compensation.
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3.2 CEO Characteristics
3.2.1 Duality
There are different views in academic literature concerning the leadership structure in
companies. Shareholder activists favor a separation of the two titles emphasizing the
control exerted over the board of directors by a CEO-chairman. However some companies
argue that a combination of titles is beneficial.
The role of the chairman of the board is to organize board meetings and to be the leader
when it comes to decision-making within the board (Conyon and Peck, 1998).
Core et al. (1999) find that CEO compensation is higher when the CEO holds the seat
of chairman of the board; the authors argue that a company can ameliorate corporate
governance by separating those two titles. Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell (1997) also report
that CEO compensation is higher when the functions of CEO and chairman are combined,
but opposed to Core et al. (1999) they draw it back to factors as firm size, work experience
and firm performance and find no evidence that manipulative behavior is the reason of in-
creased CEO pay. The authors argue that companies remunerate their CEOs for superior
performance by granting them the title chairman of the board, but they could not identify
managerial entrenchment. It may as well be the size of the firm that requires different lead-
ership structures, small companies benefit from a combined leadership structure, where
the CEO holds the title of the chairman of the board and hence can make clear directions
and ameliorate communication between management and the board, whereas large compa-
nies benefit from separated titles that alleviate agency conflicts (Palmon and Wald, 2002).
Conyon and Peck (1998) argue that CEOs who occupy both roles might suffer from a
conflict of interests. A CEO-chairman might face this conflict of personal and professional
interests due to his self-interest as opposed to the shareholders’ interest. Contrary to their
theoretical assumptions Conyon and Peck (1998) were not able to identify a significant
relationship between the combination of titles and executive compensation.Conyon and
Murphy (2000) find a positive relationship between pay-performance sensitivities and the
combined title of CEO-chairman. Petra and Dorata (2008) show that CEOs who chair the
company’s board tend to receive higher levels of incentive pay and therefore obtain higher
levels of pay-for-performance sensitivities.There is another stem of academic literature
which takes psychological and social factors into account when analyzing CEO behavior
and the role of a CEO-chairman, namely stewardship-theory. In contrast to agency theory
this view assumes that the CEO realizes personal benefits by maximizing firm value and
acting in the best interest of shareholders, since intrinsic motivation is the driving force
such a CEO would need high decision-making authority and power, as opposed to a CEO-
agent (Davis et al., 1997). The authors argue that a CEO-steward would be motivated by
combined titles and work in the shareholder’s best interest.
Literature discussing combined titles is mixed as whether to favor CEO duality or not,
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however CEO duality seems to induce higher levels of CEO compensation. While some
authors argue in favor of separation of titles (Core et al., 1999) in order to reduce CEO
influence and strengthen corporate governance (thus avoiding the possibility that CEOs
extract higher compensation due to influencing the board of directors) others argue in
favor of a combination of positions since CEO chairmen seem to receive compensation
with higher pay-performance sensitivities (e.g. Conyon and Murphy, 2000).
H8: There is a positive relationship between combined titles and CEO compensation.
3.2.2 Tenure
Hill and Phan (1991) argue that CEOs get more entrenched the longer their tenure, and
hence significantly influence the board of directors and as a result their own pay-package.
The authors highlight that the effect of firm size on CEO compensation becomes more
important, as well as company risk and pay whereas the relationship between CEO com-
pensation and stock returns diminishes. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) hypothesize
that corporate governance should be the strongest in the beginning of a CEO’s career and
weaken over time as the CEO gains power. Their empirical results clearly show that there
is no connection between tenure and incentive pay which is tied to performance however
pay for luck is strongly tied to tenure. Anderson and Bizjak were not able to identify a
link between CEO tenure and compensation committee structure, stating that there exists
no strong evidence that CEO’s with longer tenure are able to manipulate committees and
hence ameliorate their own pay package trough rent extraction. Hermalin and Weisbach
(2003) also state that tenure weakens corporate governance and has a negative correlation
with independent boards. The lack of independence might lead to higher CEO compen-
sation, since the CEO might influence the board or the board might act in favor of their
CEO out of loyalty.
H9: Tenure has a positive connection with CEO pay
3.2.3 Stock Ownership
Laux and Laux (2008) argue that stock ownership even though it has high incentive
power, can induce wrong incentives, resulting in CEOs manipulating stock prices in order
to maximize their wealth at the expense of shareholders. Also Core, Guay, and Verrecchia
(2003) report suboptimal incentives induced by voluntary stock ownership of the CEO that
exceeds the optimal amount preferred by the firm. Adams et al. (2010) report that CEO
shareholdings have a negative connection with board independence. Klein (2006) finds
that CEO stock ownership and earnings-manipulation show a negative coefficient. CEOs
engage in earnings manipulations in order to maximize their own wealth and ameliorate
their compensation. If stock-ownership is negatively correlated to earnings manipulations
it is possible that there is a negative relationship with CEO compensation as well. Core
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et al. (1999) in accordance with their theoretical predictions find that CEO compensation
decreases with the CEO’s ownership stake.
H10: CEO compensation decreases with CEO stock ownership.
3.3 Company Characteristics
3.3.1 Company Size and Company Performance
There is a positive and significant relation between firm size and the absolute level of CEO
remuneration as well as to the percentage of incentive pay in terms of total compensation
(Daily et al., 1998). Wasserman (2006) reports that executive compensation increases
with company size, no matter if agents or stewards are considered. Company size as well
as company performance are important control variables in corporate governance research
and should be accounted for in empirical analysis.
4 Board Committees - The Role of Subordinate Board
Structures
Shareholders appoint executive and non-executive directors to the board in order to act
in their best interest and as a defense mechanism against self-interested and entrenched
executives and CEOs. Boards can conduct their work as a whole or delegate specific tasks
to sub-committees, essentially every listed company has different committees e.g. audit
committee, compensation committee, nominating committee, corporate governance com-
mittee, executive committee, finance committee, and many more.
In this section two particularly important committees are analyzed: the audit committee
and the compensation committee. According to Klein (1998) board committees are com-
posed of a fraction of the boards’ directors which have their own predefined and explicit
roles and tasks and have meeting schedules and meeting frequencies independent of the
board as a whole.
Reeb and Upadhyay (2010) argue that subcommittees ameliorate communication conflicts
as well as free-rider problems within large boards and outsider dominated boards. However
they also argue that these positive effects are absent in small or insider dominated boards
since costs in this case exceed benefits. Arranging subcommittees within the board of di-
rectors is costly due to the separation of the specialized directors into committees resulting
in less communication and hence information asymmetries besides directors’ preoccupation
with their own responsibilities (Reeb and Upadhyay, 2010). Jiraporn et al. (2009) argue
that the work at some committees might be more expertise demanding and time consum-
ing (e.g. audit committee, compensation committee and corporate governance committee).
The implication of this argument might be that these committees are more important than
other committees. Regulations concerning the audit and the compensation committee are
more accurate and stringent than for other committees, e.g. internal committees can be
composed of insiders entirely which is impossible for the two committees of interest in this
section. The two board committees that are especially designed for monitoring purposes
are the audit and the compensation committee (Klein, 1998). The author argues that they
mitigate agency problems between management and shareholders as the audit committee
ensures correct accounting information and hence balances information asymmetries and
the compensation committee designs and enforces incentive compensation contracts in
order to bring executives’ interests and shareholder interests in line.
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4.1 Audit Committee
The following paragraph describes certain requirements each audit committee of a publicly
listed company has to fulfill as stated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX 2002). An
audit committee is a committee consisting of three or more directors, which are chosen
from the general board of directors. The committee has to be composed of independent
directors whose only relation to the company is their directorship. This definition excludes
i.e. lawyer, consultants and other persons receiving compensation other than director fees
and also excludes directors considered gray from serving on a company’s audit commit-
tee. At least one of the directors serving on the committee has to be a financial expert;
a person fits this definition if education or experience leads to a profound financial and
accounting expertise. The audit committee’s role is to oversee financial and accounting
reporting. All services received by an auditor have to be revised and approved by the
audit committee first. Furthermore it is obliged to appoint, compensate and monitor the
company’s auditor which has to be chosen from registered public accounting companies.
Even though the audit committee has to be composed of independent directors, there are
exceptions to this rule, as the board can approve affiliated or executive directors if it is
not considered harmful to the company.
Example: North American Galvanizing & Coatings Inc., Def 14a, 2007-03-30, page 6. As
a practical example North American Galvanizing & Coatings Inc.’s audit committee will
be analyzed and it’s compliance with regulations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 will
be examined. During the fiscal year of interest (2006) the audit committee met six times
in order to fulfill its duties. The primary functions of the company’s audit committee are
to select independent auditors, maintain communication between the board, the financial
executive team and to monitor external auditing and the company’s financial management
as well as analyzing the environment and informing the shareholders. The audit commit-
tee consists of four directors, each of which is considered financial experienced and one of
them being a financial expert. This company’s audit committee complies with SOX reg-
ulations as well as NYSE requirements. The two most important tasks of the committee,
monitoring audit and financial reporting, are executed by regular meetings during which
important matters are discussed and decisions are made.
Krishnan (2005) states that internal control is one of the most important defense mech-
anisms. Since audit committees ensure effective control they are of particular interest
for researchers as well as for practitioners (Krishnan, 2005). The author argues that the
quality of a company’s control depends on the board of directors on the one hand and
more important on the effectiveness of the audit committee. Klein (2002) argues that in
compliance with the NYSE and the NASDAQ, all publicly listed companies must obtain
audit committees composed of at least three independent directors; hence insiders, inter-
locks and gray directors are banned from serving at these committees. However there are
exceptions to this rule, since according to Klein (2002) business relationships between the
company and the director are allowed if the audit committee benefits from the nomination
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of this particular person. Klein (1998) explains that the observed audit, compensation and
nomination committees are primarily composed of non-insiders. However according to the
author many of the directors are chosen from the fraction of gray directors, in contrast to
existing regulations which advocate complete independence from executives.
Karamanou and Vafeas (2005), similarly to the arguments presented in the section concern-
ing the full board, argue in favor of small audit committees and find a negative correlation
with market reactions to management forecasts. Krishnan (2005) states that internal con-
trol is stronger when there are more financially literate members on the audit committee.
Klein (2006) finds that boards and audit committees in particular are most efficient in re-
gard of their overseeing and monitoring duties when they are independent of management.
In the study ”Economic Determinants of Audit Committee Independence” conducted in
2002; Klein theoretically and empirically examines the various factors influencing the in-
dependence between audit committees and management. The author hypothesizes that
audit committee independence is a function of board size and board independence, and
that independence due to board expanding is costly for firms. Audit committee inde-
pendence is lower when the firm faces growth possibilities and two consecutive losses,
Klein (2002) argues that this is due to the complexity of decisions and hence the demand
for insiders with firm specific knowledge. Krishnan (2005) highlights independence as an
internal control vehicle and finds a negative association between audit committee indepen-
dence and the occurrence of internal control failures. Klein (2006) examines the relation
between earnings management and audit committee independence and finds that boards
with a majority of independent directors and earnings management show a negative asso-
ciation. Klein (1998) also shows that firms with powerful CEOs who exert influence over
the board, have lower percentages of outsiders on the two committees compared to boards
that are relatively independent from the CEO. Song and Windram (2004) find evidence
that independent audit committee outperform less independent committees in regard of
financial reporting.
H1-AC: CEO compensation is a positive function of audit committee size.
H2-AC: CEO compensation is a positive function of insider representation.
H3-AC: CEO compensation is a positive function of the percentage of gray directors.
H4-AC: CEO compensation is a negative function of outsider representation
4.2 Compensation Committee
According to the NYSE Corporate Governance Rules each listed company must have
a compensation committee, the appointed committee members have to be independent
from the company. The NYSE Corporate Governance Rules highlight that the role of the
compensation committee is to assess the CEOs performance, review and approve CEO
compensation based on their assessment, recommend non-CEO compensation and finally
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compose a compensation committee report concerning executive remuneration.
Practical Example: North American Galvanizing & Coatings Inc., Def 14a, 2007-03-30,
page 6: The company’s compensation committee composed of three directors met four
times in the fiscal year of 2006. The role of the compensation committee is to formulate
and recommend to the full board remuneration of the CEO, top executives and Directors.
This function also includes decisions over incentive pay as well as stock-based compen-
sation components. The directors of the committee are obliged to analyze and discuss
compensation and report to the shareholders in the proxy statement.
Vafeas (2003) highlights that the existing regulatory landscape defines the compensation
committee as the most essential monitor as well as decision-maker regarding CEO compen-
sation. The author argues that regulations concerning committee membership are strictly
driven by concerns that insiders are inefficient monitors and act in favor of the CEO by
boosting CEO compensation or alternatively decreasing pay-for-performance sensitivities.
Conyon and Peck (1998) highlight the importance of remuneration committees, the au-
thors state that if such committees were not established executives and above all CEOs
would set their own compensation function and reward themselves as they please. This
clearly is not in the best interest of shareholders, who want to reward CEOs for superior
performance. Moreover boards and committees tend to be less effective when the CEO of
the company occupies a director’s seat on the nominating or the compensation committee,
since he can exert more influence on the board and manipulate earnings in order to maxi-
mize compensation (Klein, 2006). However Anderson and Bizjak find no relation between
committee independence and executive compensation. Furthermore the authors find that
pay-performance-sensitivities are much higher when the CEO sits on the compensation
committee, concluding that these CEOs do not engage in manipulative behavior. Daily
et al. (1998) analyze single independence variables of the compensation committee and
find that the fraction of gray directors serving on the committee has no positive effect on
neither contingent nor non-contingent CEO compensation. Again testing for compensa-
tion committee independence the authors found no support for the assumption that less
independent boards lead to higher CEO remuneration. Vafeas (2003) does not find any
support for the assumption that insiders act in favor of the CEO, since there was no rela-
tionship between insider representation and the level or structure of CEO compensation.
Conyon and Peck (1998) find evidence that companies with compensation committees or
with a large proportion of outside directors on the compensation committee show higher
top-executive compensation functions, but more importantly there is a stronger relation
between pay and performance in these companies. Another interesting relationship is that
of CEO compensation and the stock-ownership of the members of the compensation com-
mittee - in their research Cyert, Kang, and Kumar (2002) find that CEO compensation is
negatively related to director ownership on the compensation committee.
One has to note that empirical findings regarding the compensation committee are far
more conclusive than findings concerning the board of directors or the audit committee.
CEO on Compensation Committee. Klein (2006) proves that there is a significant and
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positive connection between earnings management and the fact that CEOs occupy a seat
on their own compensation committee. The author claims that this can be due to sym-
pathetic relationships between board and CEOs or that the CEO games the system and
hence maximizes the compensation package.
4.3 Overlap of Directors
Laux and Laux (2008) argue in favor of task separation, tasks on the board should be
clearly assigned to specialized committees resulting in clear and enhanced decisions. The
authors state that this requires committee formation and more important depends on the
overlap between these committees. In their model Laux and Laux (2008) assign the task
of setting CEO pay to the compensation committee whereas monitoring is carried out
by the audit committee, which per definition is a “monitoring-committee”. The authors
argue that a higher task separation will result in powerful incentive compensation, since
the compensation committee only designs the pay package and has no monitoring func-
tions which induce more work on the individual directors. The audit committee will exert
effort and concentrate on its monitoring functions, triggered by incentives to ameliorate
monitoring (higher pay-performance sensitivities, increased possibility for earnings manip-
ulation).Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) empirically analyze whether directors serving on both
committees (leading to director overlap between the audit committee and the compensa-
tion committee) tend to modify CEO compensation in a manner that will allow them to
reduce their monitoring intensity serving on the audit committee. The authors identify
several structural variables with a negative relationship with committee overlap like board
size and number of outsiders while at the same time there is a positive relation between
committee size and dual membership. Most importantly the CEOs’ compensation package
consists of less incentive pay as the fraction of overlapping directors grows (Hoitash and
Hoitash, 2009). Contrary to the theoretic assumptions of Laux and Laux (2008) and the
empirical findings of Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) other authors identified the overlapping
variable as an ameliorator of financial reporting quality (Chandar, Chang, and Zheng,
2008). However the authors found evidence for a non-linear relationship in form of a
parabola, indicating that overlapping is positive to some extent but if a certain degree of
committee overlapping is exceeded it becomes unfavorable and costly. The authors argue
that the positive effect of director overlapping is a result of increased communication and
information exchange between the two committees (Chandar et al., 2008).
Similar to the arguments presented in the preceding sections compensation committee size
is expected to have a positive association with CEO compensation.
H-CC1: CEO compensation is a positive function of compensation committee size.
H-CC2: CEO compensation is a positive function of insider representation.
H-CC3: CEO compensation is a positive function of the percentage of gray directors.
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H-CC4: CEO compensation is a negative function of outsider representation.
H-CC5: There is a negative relationship between CEO compensation and the fraction of
overlapping directors between the compensation committee and the audit committee.
H-CC6: CEO compensation is a negative function of compensation committee stock-
ownership.
5 Endogenity
After reading a myriad of theoretical and even more important empirical academic arti-
cles about the board of directors, their role and their influence on certain other variables,
it becomes apparent that empirical research concerning boards of directors suffers from a
multitude of obstacles, first of all the work and behavior of directors cannot be observed
directly, since directors work behind closed doors hidden from the public eye. According
to Adams et al. (2010) the explanatory variable ”board of directors” cannot be analyzed
econometrically since listed corporations are by law required to have a board of directors.
The authors derive this as the reason why empirical research often focuses on structural
differences across the boards e.g. board size, percentage of insiders as opposed to gray
or outside directors, board independence, director busyness, that are used as proxies for
behavior. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) state that board behavior is connected to the
decisions (e.g. CEO pay, hiring and firing a CEO) the board of directors makes. These
structure variables are set in relation with other economic factors like CEO pay (e.g. Core
et al., 1999; Petra and Dorata, 2008, firm performance (e.g. Yermack, 1996; Callahan et al.,
2003, accounting fraud (e.g. Klein, 2002) and conclusions are made based on empirically
tested assumptions. Adams et al. (2010) argue that the difficulty with this approach is
the often cited endogenity problem, since board structure is not likely to be exogenously
determined. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) highlight that variables like company perfor-
mance or CEO turnover are the result of the directors’ decision-making process and at the
same time might change the board structure over time since demand for specific directors
changed (e.g. low performance required more monitoring, since outsiders are believed to
be better monitors, the firm might consider to replace insiders with outsiders). Adams
et al. (2010) accentuate that endogenity does not only affect empirical analysis, but also
the interpretation of empirical results. The authors argue that certain variable (e.g. high
proportion of insiders, large boards) must not a priori be interpreted as weak corporate
governance. As already pointed out different companies seem to require different boards,
there is no solution that fits all and there is a reason for it, which is not a sign of failure
in corporate governance practice. Some authors (e.g. Klein, 2002; Coles et al., 2006 have
also picked up this idea and interpret their results, which might differ from previous work
on board of directors, in a more detailed analysis instead of blaming bad corporate gover-
nance. Coles et al. (2006) argue that board size differs with firm requirements, concluding
that small and simple companies require small boards whereas for big and complex firms
the opposite is true. Even suboptimal solutions are not a priori bad decisions, since every
firm faces different decisions and has its constraints and can in fact be an optimal solution
for this particular company at this specific moment (Adams et al., 2010). Furthermore
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the authors point out what role heterogeneity plays a role in a company’s optimization
problem - since models are influenced by exogenous factors, a variation in those factors
leads to different solutions. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) highlight yet another problem
of empirical research concerning corporate governance and board of directors variables,
they differentiate two approaches of interpreting results prevailing in academic literature.
According to their work (2003) there is a possibility to interpret a result as the equilibrium
solution and on the other hand one can interpret a result out-of-equilibrium.
Consider this example in the spirit of Hermalin and Weisbach (2003): One finds a negative
and statistically significant coefficient between the percentage of insiders on the board of
directors and the pay-for-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation. One could ar-
gue the higher the percentage of insiders, the lower are pay-performance sensitivities, and
hence insiders should be banned from the board. This interpretation suffers from several
weaknesses first, it does not account for any other factors than insiders as an influen-
tial force, secondly it is proven that insiders occupy an important role as advisors and
decision-makers within the board (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Duchin et al., 2010).
The second possibility of interpreting this result would be that there are other variables
that influence the presence of insiders on the board as well as CEO compensation, e.g.
company performance, CEO performance in the last fiscal year.
There are several approaches that mitigate the problems arising with endogenity.First one
can use fixed effects models based on panel data. Conyon and Peck (1998) analyzed a sam-
ple of 94 companies over four periods accounting for misspecified variables or unobserved
variables by using a fixed effects model. Also one could try to account for endogenity
like Jiraporn et al. (2009), first the authors conducted the Hausmann Test for endogenity
checks and then used a 2SLS approach in order to correct occurring obstacles.
6 Data and Empirical Approach
6.1 Data Description
The final sample is based on a data set which in the beginning consisted of 400 cases
(companies). From this sample only those cases that met following requirements were
chosen:
1. Board of directors variables are available in the proxy statement (DEF 14A) of 2007,
showing the structure variables from the fiscal year 2006.
2. Board of director variables, particularly the relationship to the company (e.g. insider,
outsider and gray directors) are verifiable by means of external sources.
3. CEO Compensation Data, lagged for one year, is available and shown in the proxy
statement of 2008.
4. Company Data (e.g. sales, net income) are available in the proxy statement of 2007.
5. The CEO in the fiscal year 2006 was the same in 2007, in order to see how the com-
pensation changed, which would not be possible if the CEO retired in the meanwhile.
In the end a dataset of 106 valid cases was created and analyzed. The sample is made
up of firms of different sizes and industries. The median company represented in the
dataset has total revenues of 539 903 000 in 2006 USD. Data was gathered from proxy
statements (2007) published by the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) with the
aid of EDGAR (Electronic Data Gathering, Analyzing, and Retrieving), a database that
began collecting relevant data for investors in 1984. Board of directors variables were
collected from proxy statements of 2007, the period of interest was 2006. These findings
were compared with two external sources (Bloomberg Businessweek and Forbes) in order
to correctly classify companies whose directors were former employees, which are classified
as outsiders in proxy statements if their employment status ended three years before. A
case was found where the former CEO with tenure of 20 years was classified as an outsider,
cases like this cannot be regarded as independent and hence this director has to be classified
as an insider instead.
6.2 Variables
In this section all relevant variables will be presented, beginning with variables concerning
the CEO, then firm size will be considered as a control variable whereas in the final step
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the board of director variables as well as subcommittee variables will be described. Each of
the variables will be used in the descriptive analysis following in the next section as well as
in the correlation analysis, where decisions about variables important for the final model
will be made, leading subsequently to the exclusion of some of the following variables.
CEO Variables
CEO CC This dual variable takes the value of 1 if the CEO occupies a seat on the com-
pany’s compensation committee, and equals 0 if this is not the case.
CEO Chair The variable CEO chair takes the value 1 if the CEO is the chairman of the
board, otherwise the value is 0.
CEO Stock This variable represents the percentage of the CEO’s ownership of the com-
pany’s stock.
CEO Age CEO Age is a traditional human capital variable (Conyon and Murphy, 2000)
and measures the CEOs age in years.
Tenure Tenure is often used as a proxy for the CEO’s influence over the board of directors
(e.g. Hill and Phan, 1991). This variable represents the amount of years a person
serves as CEO.
Compensation There are several measures of CEO compensation that are relevant for
analysis, like salary and bonus which together represent the short term compensa-
tion and on the other hand there is the fraction of long term compensation. Short
term compensation and long term compensation are added up and indicate the level
of total CEO compensation. Compensation data are lagged one year in order to an-
alyze the effect of board variables on CEO compensation; this is standard procedure
in academic research (Daily et al., 1998). Moreover a log transformation will be
performed on each of the compensation variables, since skewed distributions distort
statistical results by inducing heteroskedasticity (Daily et al., 1998).
Gender This variable indicates if the CEO is male (0) or female (1).
Education A CEO’s education status is measured as whether (1) or not (0) a person has
a bachelors, masters, MBA, PHD, or another degree. Education is an important
variable as it represents the CEOs human capital. Belliveau, O’Reilly, and Wade
(1996) hypothesize that as human capital education also reflects social capital which
has an influence on CEO compensation.
Company Variables The following variables will be included in order to control for
company size and company performance.
Company Size The following variables will be included in order to control for company
size and company performance.
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Company Size (0,1) This nominal variable is based on f total revenues, it will take the
value one if the company has over median revenues and zero if total revenues is below
median.
Company Performance As a measure of company performance the return on assets will
be included in the analysis defined as the ratio of net income and total assets will
serve as a company performance measure.
Board of Directors Variables There is a multitude of board of directors variables that
is used as a proxy for corporate governance and hence represents the monitoring power of
a board and influence CEO compensation.
Board Board size indicates the amount of directors serving on the board in absolute terms.
Insiders, Gray Directors and Outsiders For robustness checks two slightly different defi-
nitions (Core et al., 1999; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001) are used to categorize
directors into the three categories: insiders, gray directors, and outsiders.
1. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999):
a) A director is considered to be an insider if he is or in the past was employed
as an officer by the company.
b) In contrast, a gray director is a relative of an officer or someone who has a
substantial business relationship with the firm other than regular business.
2. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001):
a) Insiders are executives, former executives and family members of present
or past executives.
b) A director is considered to be gray if he or his employer received payments
other than director fees e.g. lawyers, consultants.
Insiders Insiders are measured as the percentage of insiders serving on the board of direc-
tors.
Gray Directors The variable gray directors measures the percentage of gray directors on
the company board.
Outsiders Outsiders are measured as the fraction of directors which are neither gray nor
insiders and, hence can be classified as independent company outsiders.
Independent Board The variable independent board is a nominal variable taking the value
of 1 if the board consists of more than 50% outsiders and 0 otherwise. This variable
was used by Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), the authors argue that their indicator
variable will lead to significant results rather than the original variable measuring
the percentage of outsiders.
6 Data and Empirical Approach 32
Old Outsiders Following general academic practice (e.g. Core et al., 1999) outsiders serv-
ing on the board of directors are defined to be old, when they are older than 69.
Busy Outsiders In the spirit of Core et al. (1999) a director will be classified as busy if
he or she serves on three or more boards. When considering retired directors - if six
or more board seats are held accordingly.
Busy Board Following the approach of Fich and Shivdasani (2006) this variable examines
the board as a whole and takes the value of 1 if the board consists of a majority of
busy outsiders, otherwise the value is 0.
Outsiders Appointed by CEO Another variable is the percentage of outsiders appointed
by the company’s CEO, which is defined as the percentage of outsiders appointed
after the CEO stepped in office.
Audit Committee Size This variable represents the number of directors serving on the
audit committee.
AC Insiders Insiders serving on the audit committee are defined as the percentage of
directors serving on the audit committee who are considered insiders.
AC Gray Gray directors serving on the audit committee are defined as the percentage of
directors serving on the audit committee who are considered gray.
AC Outsiders Outsiders serving on the audit committee are defined as the percentage of
directors serving on the audit committee who are considered outsiders.
Compensation Committee Size This variable is measured as the number of directors
serving on the compensation committee.
CC Insiders Insiders serving on the compensation committee are measured as the fraction
of directors serving on the audit committee who are considered insiders.
CC Gray Directors Gray directors serving on the compensation committee are measured
as the fraction of directors serving on the audit committee who are considered affil-
iated.
CC Outsiders Outsiders, directors serving on the compensation committee are measured
as the fraction of directors serving on the audit committee who are considered out-
siders.
CC Stock The variable CC stock represents the total percentage of stock ownership of
company stock held by directors serving on the compensation committee as a group.
Overlapping Variable AC - CC The overlapping of directors serving on the audit and
compensation committee is believed to decrease monitoring and pay-setting efficiency
(Laux and Laux, 2008). This variable measures the amount of directors who serve
on both the audit and the compensation committee.
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In 1000 USD 2006 Minimum Maximum Average Median SD
Total Assets 7560 48368000 4498886.12 997034 9149349.77
Total Revenues 0 39620000 2871277.9 539903 6292061.45
R&D Expenses (36 companies) 64 5873000 407246.56 34960 1094338.93
EBIT -2949000 23381000 505804.4 66215 2400243.92
EBITDA -2419000 24233000 656186.41 97410 2639336.6
Net Income -3577000 22866000 411725 49191 2323372.14
Number of Employees 8 140000 8433 1550 18923.967
Table 6.1: Company Characteristics
Fraction of CC in AC This variable represents the fraction of directors who serve at the
company’s compensation committee and audit committee in terms of audit commit-
tee members (Laux and Laux, 2008).
6.3 Data Analysis and Results
In this paragraph analysis of the gathered data is conducted which is then followed by
description and interpretation of the results. The first section covers descriptive statistics
about the company as whole, CEO characteristics concerning gender and education, then
CEO age, tenure as well as compensation figures are presented. The following subsection
deals with descriptive analysis of the board of directors and its subcommittees. Within
the section on correlation analysis and variable selection correlation analysis about the
CEO and certain company variables will be conducted first, followed by an analysis of
the board of directors as well as the audit and compensation committee. At last the
multiple regression analysis is presented. After introducing the final model concerning the
board of directors the two corresponding models covering the audit and the compensation
committee are illustrated.
All of the empirical analyses were conducted for insider, outsider and gray directors both
in accordance with previously mentioned definitions as well as following the notion and
definitions used in the research work of Core et al. (1999) - for which results are presented
herein. The results according to the definition of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) are
very similar and are presented in the Appendix (7).
6.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Distributions - Minimums, Maximums, Means and Medians
Company Characteristics The average (median) Company generated total revenues
of 2871277900 $ (539903000$) in the year 2006. The average (median) EBIT represents
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505804400$ (66215000$) and the net income 411725000 $ (49191000$). The average (me-
dian) company owns total assets worth 4498886120 (997034000$) and employs 8433 (1550)
employees in 2006. 49.5% of the company have less than median total assets and will be
classified small companies, whereas 50.5% of the sample consists of large companies. (Ta-
ble 6.1).
CEO Characteristics Nearly all CEOs in the sample are male, representing 96% of
CEOs. The youngest CEO in the sample is 35 years old, the oldest is 84 with an average
(median) equal to 54.59 (54) years. The time span of being in office reaches from 0 years
to 27 years, however the average (median) CEO is in office for 7.55 (7) years. These
results are comparable to the sample of Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) where the average
CEO serves for more than eight years. The following percentages describe the educational
status of the CEOs; only those where information was available are considered in the
calculations above (table 6.2). The bachelors degree seems to be the most desired one
with 78.9% of the CEOs having succeeded obtaining one, 24.6% decided for a masters,
whereas 32.4% preferred a MBA and only 17.6% finished a PhD program. Only 0.9% of
the CEOs occupy a seat on their board’s compensation committee, whereas 47.7% are
chairmen of the board. In the study of Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) a much bigger
proportion of CEOs held the title of chairman of the board (84%). The declining number
of combined titles could result from stricter corporate governance guidelines as well as
from pressure by shareholder activists and institutional investors. However this represents
a very large fraction of combined titles, generally corporate governance guidelines are in
favor of separated titles. These regulations obviously seem to have little impact in the real
business world. The observed situation is conflicting with recommendations from academic
literature since most of the authors argue for separating the roles of chairman of the
board and CEO for different reasons e.g. ameliorating corporate governance (Core et al.,
1999), alleviation of agency conflicts (Palmon and Wald, 2002) and solving personal and
professional conflicts of interest (Conyon and Peck, 1998). A decision in favor of combined
titles would only be feasible if representing an intrinsic motivator (Davis et al., 1997)
and if higher pay-for-performance sensitivities are achieved (Petra and Dorata, 2008). In
contrast it seems exceptional that a CEO is member of his own compensation committee,
guidelines regarding this situation are strict and only one of the CEOs in the sample
occupies a seat on the compensation committee.
CEO Compensation The CEO compensation function consists of various compensa-
tion elements, like salary and bonus and other short-term compensation which together
constitute the fraction of the short-term oriented part of the CEOs’ compensation. The
rest of the compensation package represents long-term oriented remuneration. Total com-
pensation is defined as the sum of short-term and long term compensation. There are many
possible ways of designing CEO compensation as observable in table 6.3. The lowest salary
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Male, no Female, yes
Gender 96% 4%
Bachelors 21.1% 78.9%
Masters 75.4% 24.6%
MBA 67.6% 32.4%
PhD 82.4% 17.6%
Others 92.6% 7.4%
CEO CC 99.1% 0.9%
CEO Chair 52.3% 47.7%
Table 6.2: CEO characteristics
Minimum Maximum Average Median SD
Age 35 84 54.59 54 8.467
Tenure (2007) 0 27 7.55 7 5.844
Salary 1 5323367 649413.96 520385 541695.838
Bonus 1000 18500000 895220.61 250219 2895363.31
Other Short-Term Compensation 88953 1069641 623153.67 710867 496192.966
Total Short-Term Compensation 1899 23800000 1009695.64 667000 2313387.95
Long-Term Compensation 0 25372500 3144802.84 1260101 4535176.98
Total Compensation 154616 36800000 4154498.48 2077405 5783799.49
CEO Stock 0 0.797 0.069575 0.023 0.1292582
Table 6.3: CEO compensation
is 1$ paid by Google, the maximum is as much as 5323367$ for CBS’ CEO Leslie Moonves,
the average (median) however is 649414 $ (520385 $). The distribution of bonus payments
usually paid at the end of a fiscal year as a reward for special achievements within the cov-
ered period is more skewed with an average of 895221 $ compared to a median of 250219
$. The average (median) CEO earns 1009696 $ (667000 $) in short-term compensation.
Concerning long-term incentive payments there even is one CEO that doesn’t receive any
long-term payments whatsoever, a very uncommon situation. The average (median) CEO
receives 3144803 $ (1260101 $) of his compensation in form of long-term incentive pay-
ments. Total compensation reaches from 154616$ (minimum) to 36800000 $ (maximum)
with the average at 4154498 $ and the median is 2077405 $ (Table 6.3).
Board Characteristics The average board consists of 8.64 board members with the
smallest board in the sample consisting of 4 directors and the largest of 15. 28.08% of
these members are considered insiders, 4.57% are gray directors and 62.47% represent
the fraction of outsiders and hence considered independent directors serving on the av-
erage board. These results seem consistent with the findings of Core et al. (1999) who
report 33% insiders, 7% gray and 3% interlocked and 60% independent directors; and Fich
and Shivdasani (2006) (approximately 45% insiders and gray, 55% outsiders). Corporate
governance developments seem to have an impact since the fraction of insiders decreased
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Minimum Maximum Average Median SD
Board size 4 15 8.64 8 2.2995
Percentage of Insiders 7.69 71.43 28.08 28.57 0.1369
Percentage of Gray directors 0 54.54 4.57 0 0.0976
Percentage of Outsiders 9.09 92.31 62.47 63.64 0.1632
Percentage of Busy outsiders 0 92.31 37.69 40 0.2115
Percentage of Old outsiders 0 42.86 7.92 0 0.09797
Percentage of Outsiders CEO appointed 0 92.31 44.85 44.44 0.234
Table 6.4: Board Characteristics
compared to earlier results. As already discussed outsiders could fall in one of the fol-
lowing categories: old outsiders (7.92%), busy outsiders (37.69%) and outsiders appointed
by the CEO (44.85%). A majority (76%) of the boards can be classified as independent,
according to Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) a board is independent when more than 50%
of the directors are outsiders. It is quite the opposite when looking at board busyness,
only 23% of the boards in the sample are busy meaning that more than 50% of the out-
siders serving on the board are classified as busy - Fich and Shivdasani (2006) use this
approach and refer to this variable as “the busy board indicator” and show a similar result
of 21.42%. Although a large fraction of the samples outsiders are busy they seem to be
well distributed within the various companies.
As discussed earlier (section 3.1.1) most of the authors (e.g. Core et al., 1999; Hermalin
and Weisbach, 2003; Yermack, 1996) propose small boards due to their efficiency. One
study that identifies the weaknesses of large boards, but when possible recommend the us-
age of subcommittees to set-off negative effects (Reeb and Upadhyay, 2010). Only a small
number of authors argues in favor of large boards resulting in better monitoring in form
of the audit committee (Klein, 2002) or to satisfy advising needs of complex companies
(Coles et al., 2006). As obvious from Table 6.4 there are some extremely large boards, but
they are the exception; a median of 8 members represents a plausible number of directors
for the size of the companies observed. The fraction of old outsiders is very small and since
earlier studies failed to identify an effect on either performance or CEO compensation it is
doubtful that they will have an effect regarding further analysis. However busyness might
well become an issue since a considerable amount of directors is busy and even a quarter
of all boards is classified as busy. While institutional and private investors are worried
about busy directors serving on their company’s board academic literature is ambivalent
concerning that question. On the one side busyness is seen as a quality attribute (e.g.
Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jiraporn et al., 2009) others interpret it as a weakness (e.g. Core
et al., 1999). Nearly half of the outsiders are CEO appointed which is generally criticized
by academics (e.g. Core et al., 1999), arguing that the insiders are CEO appointed as
well nearly the whole board is CEO appointed and might suffer from CEO entrenchment
(Table 6.4).
6 Data and Empirical Approach 37
Minimum Maximum Average Median SD
Audit Committee Size 2 6 3.63 3 0.927
Percentage of Insiders 0 66.67 5.14 0 0.127
Percentage of Gray directors 0 50 3 0 0.0971
Percentage of Outsiders 16.67 100 87.09 100 0.1849
Table 6.5: Audit Committee Characteristics
Committee Characteristics The following section shows the results of the descriptive
statistics concerning committees.
Audit Committee Characteristics There is much less variation in audit committee
size than there is in general board size, the smallest committee is constituted by 2 directors
while the biggest sub-board is made up by 6 directors, the median committee consists of 3
members. One can identify a very different pattern concerning the presence of insiders and
gray directors on the audit committee as opposed to the board as a whole. Only 5.14%
of these subcommittee directors are considered insiders and 3.00% are gray directors,
adding up to 8.14% of directors fitting the classification of being dependent compared
to the over 30% of insiders and gray directors on the whole board. The median is zero
insiders and gray directors and 100% outsiders. Thus 87.09% of the audit committee’s
directors represent outsiders. Klein (2002) reports similar results with a proportion if
79.6% being outsiders, 1.4% being insiders and 19% being affiliated directors. The big
difference between the affiliates in Klein’s study and the present results concerning gray
directors is explained by the different definitions chosen and hence the smaller fraction
of insiders in Klein (2002)’s sample. However the total of dependent directors in Klein
(2002) accounts for 20% of the directors - in contrast only 8.14% of the directors on average
have ties to the company, which results from the rigorous changes in corporate governance
regulation, namely the commencement of SOX 2002. As discussed earlier (section 4.1) the
audit committee has to be composed of independent directors, which excludes insiders and
gray directors. Exceptions to this rule are possible, surprisingly there are some boards
where insiders represent 66.67% of the board - which clearly is not supportive of this
rule. Overall most companies acknowledge the independence regulation since on average
only 5.14% of the audit committee members are insiders and a slightly larger fraction
is considered gray. Half of the sample shows no insiders or gray directors on the audit
committee in accordance to general corporate governance regulations (Table 6.5).
Compensation Committee Characteristics The structure of the compensation com-
mittee leaves a similar impression to the one of the audit committee, the committee size
reaching from 2 directors on the smallest committee up to 8 directors on the largest com-
mittee. However note that a compensation committee size of 8 directors is very big and
unusual as the median committee has 3 appointed directors. On average 5.57% of the
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Minimum Maximum Average Median SD
Compensation Committee Size 2 8 3.56 3 1.074
Percentage of Insiders 0 66.67 5.57 0 0.1373
Percentage of Gray directors 0 66.67 5.14 0 0.1452
Percentage of Outsiders 0 100 85.53 100 21.44
Overlapping CC/AC 0 100 49.77 50 0.3199
CC Stock in Percent 0 25 1.82 0.3 0.0443
Table 6.6: Compensation Committee Characteristics
directors are insiders, 5.14% are gray and 85.53% are outsiders while the median structure
shows no insiders and gray directors but 100% outsiders. On average there is a director
overlap of almost 50% between the audit and the compensation committee. The mem-
bers of the compensation committee on average (median) hold 1.82% (0.30%) of company
stock. As for audit committees the regulations concerning insiders and affiliated directors
on compensation committees is rather strict, they allow for non-independent directors
exceptionally. The impression the data makes is much the same with the only difference
of slightly fewer insiders on the committee but at the same time with a slightly higher
proportion of gray directors. Here also half of the companies are in full compliance with
regulated corporate governance standards. A massive director overlap between the audit
committee and the compensation committee can be however identified - a fact unfavorable
according to certain academics (Laux and Laux, 2008; Hoitash and Hoitash, 2009) (Table
6.6).
Correlation and Variable Selection
In the following, correlation analysis is presented in order to provide an overview of the
main variables and their interdependencies. The analysis is structured as follows, first
the board of directors as a whole is discussed, then the two subcommittees namely the
audit committee and the compensation committee are covered. Furthermore, the selection
process of the variables included in the final model is described.
Correlation Analysis - CEO Characteristics and Firm Variables Surprisingly
there are no significant results when analyzing the correlation of compensation variables
and the occurrence of combined titles. The variable measuring CEO tenure correlates
with age, combined titles and CEO stock. This is not surprising, since the longer a
CEO’s tenure, the older he is most probably. CEOs with longer tenure tend to occupy the
position of chairman of the board more often that CEOs who are new to the company and
in addition it seems that the longer a CEO serves, the more company stock is held. Tenure
shows negative coefficients across all fractions of the CEO compensation package, long-
term compensation (r = −0.261, p < 0.01) and total compensation (r = −0.305, p < 0.01)
showing significant results. If tenure brings forward managerial entrenchment and hence
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CEO chair CEO stock Age Tenure Fem Company Company Company log salary log st log lt
Size Size (0,1) performance
CEO stock corr. .301 ∗∗
sig. 0.002
Age corr. 0.084 -0.044
sig. 0.388 0.654
Tenure corr. .260 ∗∗ .346 ∗∗ 0.169
sig. 0.007 0 0.082
Fem corr. -0.045 -0.07 -0.073 -0.045
sig. 0.659 0.488 0.47 0.658
Company corr. -0.115 -.267 ∗∗ 0.077 -0.18 -0.039
Size sig. 0.242 0.006 0.435 0.065 0.701
Company corr. 0.01 -.249 ∗∗ 0.098 -0.179 -0.176 .671 ∗∗
Size (0.1) sig. 0.92 0.01 0.315 0.065 0.08 0
Company corr. -.070 -.079 -0.017 .001 -.038 .501 ∗∗ .194
performance sig. .474 0.420 0.865 0.993 .709 .000 .045
log salary corr. -0.089 -0.106 0.105 -0.059 0.021 0.127 0.098 .016
sig. 0.361 0.275 0.282 0.549 0.838 0.193 0.317 .873
log st corr. -0.106 -0.177 0.119 -0.13 -0.015 .330 ∗∗ .262 ∗∗ .049 .831 ∗∗
sig. 0.279 0.068 0.221 0.181 0.88 0.001 0.006 .614 0
log lt corr. -0.04 -.308 ∗∗ 0.105 -.261 ∗∗ -0.018 .648 ∗∗ .499 ∗∗ .167 .335 ∗∗ .387 ∗∗
sig. 0.686 0.001 0.284 0.007 0.861 0 0 .088 0 0
log T C corr. -0.053 -.335 ∗∗ 0.095 -.305 ∗∗ -0.026 .684 ∗∗ .548 ∗∗ .154 .454 ∗∗ .629∗∗ .885 ∗∗
sig. 0.591 0 0.332 0.001 0.798 0 0 .114 0 0 0
∗∗,∗ Significant at the 0.01, 0.05, levels, respectively
Table 6.7: CEO characteristics and Company variables
weakens corporate governance one would expect CEO compensation to rise in salary and
drop in performance based compensation measures. The negative coefficients of long-term
compensation imply such a relationship, however the coefficients, although insignificant,
are negative for the other compensation measures as well. CEO stock, which measures
the percentage of CEO stockholding of company shares, shows negative coefficients over
all compensation measures, whereas the relation with short-term (r = −0.177, p < 0.1)
and long-term compensation (r = −0.308, p < 0.01) as well as with total compensation
(r = −0.335, p < 0.001) are significant.CEO age correlates with tenure (r = −0.169,
p < 0.1) but no other significant coefficients can be found. The variable indicating the
CEOs gender cannot be interpreted because the amount of women in the sample is far too
small to show significant and meaningful results. Like expected the variable total revenues
shows positive, significant and very strong correlations with all the CEO compensation
measures except for salary. The strongest effects are revealed when considering long-term
compensation log lt (r = 0.648, p = p < 0.1) and total compensation (r = 0.684, p < 0.01),
short-term compensation(r = 0.330, p < 0.01) is less interdependent. These results seem
plausible since CEOs often are evaluated and remunerated based on firm performance.
The variable company size (0,1), which is a nominal variable based on total revenues
grouping the companies in two categories (small, large), shows very similar but not as
strong results (Table 6.7).
Correlation Analysis - Board of Directors Like expected the variable board size
correlates positively with all components of the CEO compensation package, the results for
short-term (r = 0.331, p < 0.01) , long-term (r = 0.545, p < 0.01) and total compensation
(r = 0.605, p < 0.01) being significant. The strongest effects can be identified for long-
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term and total compensation. This suggests that the influence on variable compensation
is very strong, opposed to fixed compensation where there is no significance(r = 0.154,
p = 0.11). The variable measuring the percentage of insiders on the company board in-
dicates negative and significant correlations for all compensation elements; the results for
long-term compensation (r = −0.443, p < 0.01) and total compensation (r = −0.383,
p < 0.01) is stronger than for salary (r = −0.165, p < 0.1) and short-term compensation
(r = −0.178, p < 0.1). The fraction of gray directors correlates positively and significantly
with short-term compensation (r = 0.195, p < 0.05); the variable, however insignificant,
shows positive coefficients across the other compensation variables. Outsiders show posi-
tive and significant coefficients with long-term compensation (r = 0.285, p < 0.01) as well
as with total compensation (r = 0.274, p < 0.01) and, however the positive coefficient
with salary and short-term compensation are insignificant.
These findings imply that outsiders are effective actors on a company board since they
seem to have a positive effect on pay-for-performance which in turn might be due to their
concern to tie company success to CEO wealth by increasing performance based compen-
sation. Additionally the fraction of outsiders correlates strongly and positively with other
dependent variables, all of which are outsider based measures like old outsiders, outsiders
that are appointed by the CEO and busy outsiders. The variable independent board
shows similar but weaker results than the percentage of outsiders. There is no significant
relation between old outsiders and the CEO compensation package. The variable busy
outsiders shows a positive and significant correlation with board size, it seems that the
bigger a board gets, the more busy outsiders occupy a seat on the board. It seems to be
hard for a board to find many outsiders that are not busy. The coefficient with insiders is
very strong and negative, which indicates that insiders and busy outsiders might represent
substitutes for each other. The more busy outsiders there are on a board the fewer insiders
are represented on this board and vice versa.
Busy outsiders - the fraction of outsiders considered busy, correlate positively and signif-
icantly with all compensation measures. Again the results for long-term compensation
(r = 0.422, p < 0.01) and total compensation (r = 0.404, p < 0.01) prove to be stronger
than for salary(r = 0.172, p < 0.1) and short-term compensation (r = 0.187, p < 0.1).
The variable busy board shows similar but less qualitative results than the variable busy
board. Outsiders appointed by the CEO show no significant or meaningful relation to any
of the compensation measures (Table 6.8).
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boardsize in gray out ind board old out busy out busy board out ceo log salary log st log lt
in corr. -.231 ∗
sig. 0.017
gray corr. 0.029 -0.138
sig. 0.768 0.156
out corr. 0.155 -.676 ∗∗ -.436 ∗∗
sig. 0.111 0 0
ind board corr. 0.036 -.418 ∗∗ -.444 ∗∗ .749 ∗∗
sig. 0.714 0 0 0
old out corr. 0.072 0.053 -0.109 0.036 0.076
sig. 0.461 0.59 0.263 0.712 0.437
busy out corr. .318 ∗∗ -.521 ∗∗ -0.141 .581 ∗∗ .404 ∗∗ -.217 ∗
sig. 0.001 0 0.148 0 0 0.025
busyboard corr. .259 ∗∗ -.345 ∗∗ -0.115 .456 ∗∗ .313 ∗∗ -0.094 .746 ∗∗
sig. 0.007 0 0.236 0 0.001 0.338 0
out ceo corr. -0.137 -. 5 ∗∗ -0.135 .418 ∗∗ .287 ∗∗ -0.011 0.149 0.147
sig. 0.159 0.002 0.167 0 0.003 0.911 0.125 0.13
log salary corr. 0.154 -.165 ∗ 0.03 0.101 -0.04 0.076 .172 ∗ 0.151 -0.021
sig. 0.114 0.09 0.759 0.301 0.685 0.438 0.077 0.121 0.829
log st corr. .331∗∗ -0.178 .195∗ 0.054 -0.068 0.014 .187 ∗ 0.139 -0.037 .831 ∗∗
sig. 0.001 0.067 0.044 0.583 0.487 0.889 0.054 0.154 0.702 0
log lt corr. .545 ∗∗ -.443 ∗∗ 0.103 .285 ∗∗ 0.153 -0.041 .422 ∗∗ .274 ∗∗ -0.086 .335 ∗∗ .387 ∗∗
sig. 0 0 0.291 0.003 0.118 0.679 0 0.004 0.381 0 0
log T C corr. .605 ∗∗ -.383 ∗∗ 0.118 .274 ∗∗ 0.113 -0.001 .404 ∗∗ .326 ∗∗ -0.1 .454 ∗∗ .629 ∗∗ .885 ∗∗
sig. 0 0 0.226 0.004 0.246 0.992 0 0.001 0.308 0 0 0
∗∗,∗ Significant at the 0.01, 0.05, levels, respectively
Table 6.8: Board analysis
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ac size in ac gray ac out ac log salary log st log lt
in ac corr. 0.165
sig. 0.09
gray ac corr. -0.063 0.023
sig. 0.517 0.815
out ac corr. -0.049 -.593 ∗∗ -.423 ∗∗
sig. 0.613 0 0
log salary corr. .231 ∗ -.220 ∗ 0.077 0.09
sig. 0.017 0.023 0.43 0.355
log st corr. .258 ∗∗ -0.121 .254 ∗∗ -0.036 .831 ∗∗
sig. 0.007 0.214 0.008 0.713 0
log lt corr. .505 ∗∗ 0.021 0.048 -0.043 .335 ∗∗ .387 ∗∗
sig. 0 0.832 0.625 0.662 0 0
log T C corr. .544 ∗∗ 0.018 0.08 -0.024 .454 ∗∗ .629 ∗∗ .885 ∗∗
sig. 0 0.854 0.414 0.803 0 0 0
∗∗,∗ Significant at the 0.01, 0.05, levels, respectively
Table 6.9: Audit Committee Analysis
Correlation Analysis - Committees In this section the correlation analysis for the
audit committee and the compensation committee will be presented.
Correlation Analysis - Audit Committee The variable measuring audit committee
size reveals significant, high and positive coefficients for salary (r = 0.231, p < 0.05), short-
term compensation (bonus payments and other short-term compensation) (r = 0.258, p <
0.01) as well as with long-term compensation (r = 0.505, p < 0.01) and total compensation
(r = 0.544, p < 0.01). The results are similar to the results from the board analysis (table
6.8), where size had a positive effect on CEO compensation. The fraction of insiders
on the audit committee is negatively and significantly related to the fixed part of CEO
compensation (r = 0.220, p < 0.05). Short-term compensation shows a negative but
insignificant coefficient, long-term compensation and total compensation show a very weak
and positive but not significant relation. The percentage of gray directors serving on the
audit committee correlates positively with all compensation measures, though only short-
term compensation (r = 0.254, p < 0.01) shows significant results. The variable outsiders
shows a negative but insignificant correlation over all parts of the compensation package.
The correlation analysis reveals that the independent variables are significantly correlated
with each other (Table 6.9).
Correlation Analysis - Compensation Committee Similarly to the previous section
concerning the audit committee, compensation committee size is positively correlated
with all components of CEO compensation, whereas long-term compensation (r = 0.03,
p < 0.01) and total compensation (r = 0.421, p < 0.01) show the strongest connection
followed by short-term compensation (r = 0.240, p < 0.05) and salary (r = 0.169, p < 0.1).
6 Data and Empirical Approach 43
cc size in cc gray cc out cc over- fraction CC stock log salary log st log lt
lapping cc/ac
in cc corr. -0.014
sig. 0.885
gray cc corr. 0.023 -0.017
sig. 0.813 0.86
out cc corr. 0.006 -.597 ∗∗ -.446 ∗∗
sig. 0.953 0 0
overlapping corr. .312 ∗∗ -0.047 0.054 0.012
sig. 0.001 0.628 0.582 0.902
fraction cc/ac corr. -0.155 -0.066 0.012 0.025 .851∗∗
sig. 0.112 0.5 0.905 0.795 0
CC stock corr. 0.052 -0.031 .280 ∗∗ -0.146 .217 ∗ 0.163
sig. 0.597 0.755 0.003 0.134 0.025 0.094
log salary corr. 0.169 -0.011 0.06 -0.022 0.072 0.016 -0.107
sig. 0.083 0.912 0.536 0.825 0.46 0.87 0.273
log st corr. .240∗ 0.009 0.066 0.02 0.071 -0.025 -0.161 .831 ∗∗
sig. 0.013 0.926 0.499 0.841 0.468 0.8 0.098 0
log lt corr. .403∗∗ 0.05 0.07 -0.024 -0.183 -.420 ∗∗ -0.156 .335 ∗ .387 ∗∗
sig. 0 0.611 0.477 0.807 0.06 0 0.11 0 0
log T C corr. .421 ∗∗ 0.07 0.037 0.01 -0.13 -.334 ∗∗ -.218 ∗ .454 ∗∗ .629 ∗∗ .885 ∗∗
sig. 0 0.476 0.702 0.916 0.181 0 0.024 0 0 0
∗∗,∗ Significant at the 0.01, 0.05, levels, respectively
Table 6.10: Compensation Committee Analysis
The fraction of insiders shows positive coefficients except for the fixed part of remuneration,
all of them lacking significance. Gray directors have a positive but insignificant association
with all components of CEO compensation. The findings for the percentage of outsiders are
inconclusive and not significant. The variable measuring the director overlap between audit
committee and compensation committee shows one significant and negative coefficient with
long-term compensation (r = −0.183, p < 0.1). The same is true for the variable measuring
the overlap in terms of audit committee members (r = −0.420, p < 0.01); in addition this
variable shows a negative and significant association with total CEO compensation (r =
−0.334, p < 0.01). The percentage of stock held by compensation committee members
shows a significant and negative correlation with short-term compensation (r = −0.161,
p < 0.1) as well as with total compensation (r = −0.218, p < 0.01). As before the
explanatory variables are correlated (Table 6.10).
Variable Selection Overall, the independent variables exhibit strong correlations among
each other resulting in potential multicollinearity. Furthermore, some variables have a
large number of missing values that would drastically reduce the sample size of the fi-
nal models. For other variables, such as gender, the distribution does not allow to make
reliable interpretation - this variable will be considered however in further analysis for
completeness. In order to select the most appropriate variables, correlation, number of
missings and their distribution were considered. Furthermore, regression analyses and
multicollinearity measures (variance inflation factors) have been calculated in order to
identify potentially problematic variables and to choose between conflicting variables.
6 Data and Empirical Approach 44
The variable indicating if the CEO is a member of the compensation committee will not
be considered in any of the following analysis and was left out of the correlation analysis as
well since there is just one case where the CEO was part of the compensation committee
and meaningful results are impossible to obtain.
Next variables of concern are educational are educational variables represented in the
section discussing descriptive analysis (table 6.2) namely bachelors, Masters, MBA, PhD
and others. These variables suffer from a large number of missing values which will min-
imize the sample for the final analysis dramatically, hence these variables will not be
considered in the final regression model. The next few variables are considered potential
threats for the final model since they are correlated highly with each other and might
induce avoidable multicollinearity. The variable company size (0,1) is excluded from fur-
ther analysis since the results equal those of the variable log revenues with slightly weaker
correlations, further the two variables correlate highly (r = 0.671, p < 0.01) which might
lead to unnecessary multicollinearity and distort the results of the final model.
The variable independent board shows similar but weaker results than the variable mea-
suring the percentage of outsider on the board having a VIF (variance inflation factor) of
about 2.5 over all regression analysis, especially regarding the association with compensa-
tion variables and is therefore not considered in further analysis. Again the two variables
correlate highly (r = 0.749, p < 0.01). The decision regarding the variable busy board
(V IF = 2.5), that shows similar but weaker results than busy outsiders is analogous to
the variables independent board and firm size, busy board will not be accounted for in
following analysis due to high correlation (r = 0.746, p < 0.01) with and weaker results
than the variable busy outsiders.
Due to the high correlation between the two variables overlapping and fraction cc/ac
(r = 0.851, p < 0.01) and the similar findings, whereas the later shows stronger results
and additionally correlates with total compensation, thus variable overlapping will not be
considered in further analysis.
6.3.2 Results
In this section the multiple regression models are presented, beginning with the board of
directors. Both the audit committee and the compensation committee are discussed and
analyzed in different models due to the high correlations between the respective variables.
Regression Analysis - Board of Directors Structure and CEO Compensation
This paragraph discusses the effects of structure on several compensation measures. The
dependent variables are salary, short term-compensation, long-term compensation and to-
tal compensation - all of which are log transformed. The independent variables are board
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size, the percentage of insiders (%Insiders), the percentage of gray directors (%Gray Di-
rectors) and the percentage of outsiders (%Outsiders), the percentage of old outsiders
(%Old outsiders), the percentage of outsiders appointed by the CEO (%Outsiders CEO
appointed), a gender dummy (1) for female and (0) for male, the CEO’s age (CEO Age),
the CEO’s tenure (Tenure), a variable indicating combined titles(CEO Chair Dummy) (1)
combined and (0) separated CEO and chairman, the percentage of CEO stock-ownership
(CEO stock) and a variable controlling for firm size (log total Revenues)and one con-
trolling for company performance (ROA). This analysis was also conducted with robust
regression.1
Log Compensation =
α+ β1BoardSize+ β2%Insiders+ β3%GrayDirectors+
β4%Outsiders+ β5%OldOutsiders+ β6%Busy Outsiders+
β7%OutsidersCEO appointed+ β8GenderDummy + β9CEOAge+
β10Tenure+ β11CEOChair Dummy + β12CEOStock+
β13Company Size+ β14Company Performance
(6.1)
The multiple regression models differ in value, with adjusted R2 values of −0.062 for
salary, which implies that the model has no explanatory power. Moreover the F-Statistics
show that the model is insignificant with a p-value far over 0.1. Each of the other three
models is significant, again the results from long-term compensation (p < 0.01) and total
compensation (p < 0.01) are superior in significance compared to short-term compen-
sation (p < 0.1). The short-term compensation model showing a adjusted R2 value of
0.081 is better than the one for salary since it explains about 10 percent of the varia-
tion. Contrary the models for long-term compensation (adjusted R2 = 0.610) and total
compensation (adjusted R2 = 0.57) are very powerful. It seems that board structure
variables in general represent good explanatory variables for long-term compensation and
hence also for total compensation since the first makes up a significant part of total CEO
compensation. The results concerning board size from the correlation analysis hold in the
multiple regression model only for total compensation (β = 0.035, p < 0.1), the coeffi-
cients is positive like expected. Board size however does not seem to have any influence on
salary (β = 0.000, p > 0.1), short-term compensation (β = 0.024, p > 0.1) and long-term
compensation (β = 0.024, p > 0.1). In support of H1 all coefficient are positive, though
1The robust regressions for the board of directors show following results (compared to table 6.11).
For salary the coefficients of board size (β = 0.017, p < 0.05), the percentage of insiders (β =
−0.346, p < 0.1) and company size (β = 0.159, p < 0.01) are significant, whereas linear regression
shows no significant coefficients. Short-term compensation shows significant coefficients for board
size (β = 0.018, p < 0.1), the percentage of gray directors (β = 0.606, p < 0.05), company size
(β = 0.125, p < 0.01) and company performance (β = −0.190, p < 0.1). No significant differences
were observed for long-term compensation. For total compensation the results resemble those of the
linear regression, additionally tenure (β = −0.011, p < 0.1) is significant. Note that the models con-
sidered less powerful in the linear regression analysis (salary and short-term compensation) show more
differences when compared to robust regression models than the two models with high explanatory
power (long-term compensation and total compensation).
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not all of them are significant. There is a negative relationship between all compensation
measures and the percentage of insiders on the board. All coefficients are negative and the
effect on long-term compensation (β = −2.512, p < 0.01) and hence total compensation
(β = −0.965, p < 0.05) is stronger than on fixed compensation (β = −0.650, p < 0, 01)
and short-term compensation (β = −0, 088, p > 0, 1). The coefficients concerning gray
directors2 are insignificant over all compensation measures, hence H3 is not supported.
The results from the correlation analysis do not hold for outsiders, all coefficients are neg-
ative and insignificant, most of them being close to zero, hence supporting H4 as there
seems to be no relationship between the percentage of outsiders and CEO compensation.
Like before, in the correlation analysis the variable measuring the fraction of old outsiders
cannot be linked to any form of CEO compensation, hence no support for hypothesis H5 is
found. The fraction of busy outsiders showed positive and significant results over all com-
pensation measures in the correlation analysis; however this connection is not reinforced
in the multiple regression analysis rejecting hypothesis H6. Like in the previous section
concerning correlation analysis no association of directors appointed by the CEO on CEO
compensation could be identified. Also the variable indicating that the CEO serves as
chairman of the board shows no significant results, no evidence of H8 could be found
in the data. This result is not surprising since other authors obtained the same results
before (e.g. Conyon and Peck, 1998). Concerning CEO tenure the implication from the
correlation analysis do not hold in the regression model, hence no support for H9 could be
found in the data. Like predicted and implied by the results concerning correlations the
coefficients measuring the influence of CEO stock ownership on CEO compensation are
negative however lacking significance. Again the variable company size measured as the
logarithm of total revenues shows positive and significant coefficients for long-term com-
pensation (β = 0.516, p < 0, 01) and total compensation (β = 0.314, p < 0.01) while the
coefficients of salary and short-term compensation lack significance. This seems plausible
since salary is the fixed part of compensation and hence independent of revenues and also
short-term compensation might not be tied to revenues but to other operational results or
subjective assessment. Company performance measured as the return of assets shows neg-
ative coefficients over all compensation measures, however only long-term compensation
(β = −0.872, p < 0.05) and total compensation (β = −0.607, p < 0.01) show significant
results.
Regression Analysis - Committees
In the following paragraphs the models for the audit committee and the compensation
committee will be introduced.
2When excluding gray directors from the models in table 6.11 the results are very similar to those
above, only the results concerning short-term compensation change as company size becomes significant
(β = 0.113, p < 0.05).
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coefficients and t-statistics
log salary log st log lt log T C
Intercept 5.321 (5.697) ∗∗∗ 4.917 (9.115) ∗∗∗ 4.231 (5.280) ∗∗∗ 4.786 (10.745) ∗∗∗
Board Size 0.000 (0.007) 0.024 (1.084) 0.031 (0.987) 0.035 (1.938) ∗
%Insiders -0.650 (-0.731) -0.088 (-0.172) -2.512 (-3.261) ∗∗∗ -0.965 (-2.275) ∗∗
%Gray Directors -0.039 (-0.037) 0.738 (1.198) -0.761 (-0.835) -0.030 (-0.059)
%Outsiders -0.332 (-0,361) -0.053 (-0.100) -0.910 (-1.149) -0.246 (-0.560)
%Old Outsiders 0.707 (1.020) 0.209 (0.521) 0.307 (0.526) 0.355 (1.074)
%Busy Outsiders 0.461 (1.119) 0.192 (0.808) 0.329 (0.948) 0.202 (1.030)
%Outsiders CEO appointed -0.052 (-0.148) 0.055 (0.267) -0.214 (-0.722) -0.082 (-0.486)
Female 0.136 (0.404) 0.008 (0.041) 0.087 (0.306) 0.009 (0.054)
CEO Age 0.005 (0.590) 0.002 (0.451) -0.001 (-0.181) -0.002 (-0.491)
CEO Tenure 0.000 (0.031) 0.000 (0.032) -0.012 (-1.074) -0.,009 (-1.314)
CEO Chair -0.107 (-0.782) -0.041 (-0.516) 0.076 (0.662) 0.059 (0.906)
CEO Stock -0.075 (-0.132) -0.237 (-0.720) -0.263 (-0.548) -0.287 (-1.060)
Company Size 0.061 (0.605) 0.094 (1.608) 0.516 (6.097) ∗∗∗ 0.314 (6.545) ∗∗∗
Company Performance -0.250 (-0.618) -0.282 (-1.208) -0.872 (-2.569) ∗∗ -0.607 (-3.149) ∗∗∗
n 105 105 104 105
Adjusted R2 -0.062 0.081 0.556 0.610
∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ Significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Table 6.11: Board of Directors Structure and CEO Compensation.
Regression Analysis - Audit Committee Structure and CEO Compensation
This subsection analyzes the effects of compensation committee structure on several com-
pensation measures.
The dependent variables are salary, short term-compensation, long-term compensation
and total compensation. Among the independent variables are audit committee size, the
percentage of insiders (%Insiders), the percentage of gray directors (%Gray Directors) and
the percentage of outsiders (%Outsiders) serving on the audit committee, company size
and company performance. The following analysis was also calculated with the method
robust regressions.3
Log Compensation =
α+ β1AuditCommittee Size+ β2%Insiders+
β3%GrayDirectors+ β4%Outsiders+
β5Company Size+ β6Company Performance
(6.2)
3The robust regressions regarding the audit committee characteristics show following results (compared
to table 6.12). For salary the coefficients of audit committee size (β = 0.028, p < 0.1), the percentage of
insiders serving on the audit committee (β = −0.249, p < 0.1), the percentage of outsiders serving on the
audit committee (β = −0.171, p < 0.1) and company size (β = 0.199, p < 0.01) are significant. Short-
term compensation shows significant coefficients for committee size (β = 0.048, p < 0.05), company
size (β = 0.156, p < 0.01) and company performance (β = −0.218, p < 0.1). The same is true for
long-term compensation with significant coefficients for committee size (β = 0.203, p < 0.01), company
size (β = 0.468, p < 0.01) and company performance (β = −0.843, p < 0.01). Audit committee size
(β = 0.154, p < 0.01), company size (β = 0.366, p < 0.01) and company performance (β = −0.690, p <
0.01) are the significant coefficients for total compensation.
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One has to note that overall the audit committee multiple regression models are better
compared to the models analyzing the board as a whole regarding the explanation of
salary (adjusted R2 = 0.084) and short-term compensation (adjusted R2 = 0.192). Again
the models for long-term compensation (adjusted R2 = 0.502) and total compensation
(adjusted R2 = 0.585) explain more of the variation in CEO compensation, however they
are slightly less powerful than the equivalent models concerning the board structure. Each
of the models is significant at the p < 0.01 level as evident in the F-statistics, except for
salary (p < 0.05).
The variable measuring audit committee size shows strong positive coefficients across all
compensation variables, the results are equivalent to the correlation analysis (table 6.9 )in
the section above. Again the results for long-term compensation (β = 0.236, p < 0.01) and
total compensation (β = 0.159, p < 0.01), are much stronger than for salary (β = 0.167,
p < 0.05) or short-term compensation (β = 0.076, p < 0.1). Compared to the regression
analysis of the board of directors as a whole (table 6.11)the subcommittee analysis shows
more significant results. H1-AC stating that the size of the audit committee has a positive
impact on CEO compensation found full support in the data. The fraction of insiders
serving on the audit committee seems to have a negative impact on salary (β = −1.426,
p < 0.05) short-term compensation (β = −0.716, p < 0.05), long-term compensation (β =
−1.098, p < 0.1) and total compensation (β = −0.669, p < 0.05). Overall the empirical
results do not provide any evidence for H2-AC - quite the contrary - the percentage
of insiders seems to have a negative impact on CEO compensation. Interestingly, the
variable gray directors4 serving on the audit committee shows one significant coefficient for
short-term compensation (β = 0.849, p < 0.05), equaling the results from the correlation
analysis for both the board as a whole and the audit committee. H3-AC is supported
by the multiple regression model, suggesting that the percentage of gray directors has
a positive effect on CEO compensation. However the coefficient for all but short-term
compensation are not significant. Again the fraction of outsiders serving on the audit
committee does not show any significant coefficients, the results being equivalent to the
analysis of the whole board. H4-AC was not supported by any significant coefficients,
however the signs equal the predicted direction. The variable controlling for company size
shows positive and significant coefficients for all compensation measures but salary (β =
0.057, p > 0.1). The coefficients for short-term compensation (β = 0.135, p < 0.01), long-
term compensation (β = 0.556, p < 0.01), and total compensation (β = 0.357, p < 0.01)
are much stronger. Again return on assets being a proxy for company performance seems
to have a negative impact on CEO compensation, the coefficients being significant for
long-term compensation (β = −0.892, p < 0.05) and total compensation (β = −0.653, p <
0.05).
4Again the models from table 6.12 were calculated excluding gray directors, however no significant dif-
ferences emerged.
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coefficients and t-statistics
log salary log st log lt log T C
Intercept 4.924 (8.830) ∗∗∗ 4.885 (15.020) ∗∗∗ 2.380 (4.313) ∗∗∗ 3.904 (13.211) ∗∗∗
Audit Committee Size 0.167 (2.399) ∗∗ 0.076 (1.872) ∗ 0.236 (3.551) ∗∗∗ 0.159 (4.303) ∗∗∗
%Insiders -1.426 (-2.373) ∗∗ -0.716 (-2.044) ∗∗ -1.098 (-1.891) ∗ -0.669 (-2.100) ∗∗
%Gray Directors 0.486 (0.701) 0.849 (2.098) ∗∗ -0.216 (-0.323) 0.063 (0.170)
%Outsiders -0.116 (-0.259) -0.111 (-0.424) -0.344 (-0.787) -0.138 (-0.582)
Company Size 0.057 (0.721) 0.135 (2.957) ∗∗∗ 0.556 (7.355) ∗∗∗ 0.357 (8.599) ∗∗∗
Company Performance -0.175 (-0.633) -0.296 (-1.388) -0.892 (-2.548) ∗∗ -0.653 (-3.369) ∗∗∗
n 105 105 104 105
Adjusted R2 0.084 0.192 0.502 0.585
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ Significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Table 6.12: Audit Committee Structure and CEO Compensation
Regression Analysis - Compensation Committee Structure and CEO Compen-
sation This subsection takes the effects of compensation committee structure on CEO
compensation under scrutiny.
The dependent variables are salary, short term-compensation, long-term compensation
and total compensation. This provides opportunities to investigate the impact of compen-
sation committee structure on different forms of CEO compensation. The independent
variables are compensation committee size, the percentage of stock held by compensation
committee numbers (CC Stock), the percentage of insiders (%Insiders), the percentage of
gray directors (%Gray Directors) and the percentage of outsiders (%Outsiders) serving
on the compensation committee as well as the fraction of member overlapping between
audit committee and compensation committee in terms of audit committee size (Fraction
of CC in AC), company size and company performance. The following analysis was also
calculated with the method robust regressions.5
Log Compensation = α+ β1CompensationCommittee Size+
β2CC Stock + β3%Insiders+ β4%GrayDirectors+
β5%Outsiders+ β6Fraction of CC inAC+
β7Company Size+ β8Company Performance
(6.3)
5The robust regressions regarding the compensation committee characteristics show following results
(compared to table 6.13). For salary the coefficients of committee size (β = 0.023, p < 0.1), the
fraction of compensation committee members serving on the audit committee (β = −0.102, p < 0.05),
the percentage of stock held by the compensation committee members (β = −0.745, p < 0.05) and
company size (β = 0.154, p < 0.01) are significant. Again the corresponding linear regression model
shows no significant coefficients. Short-term compensation shows significant coefficients for committee
size (β = 0.035, p < 0.1) and company size (β = 0.140, p < 0.01). Long-term compensation shows
positive coefficients for the fraction of compensation committee members serving on the audit committee
(β = −0.466, p < 0.01), company size (β = 0.575, p < 0.01) and company performance (β = 0.947, p <
0.01). The results concerning total compensation are equivalent to the corresponding linear regression
model.
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Contrary to the audit committee analysis the models analyzing salary (adjusted R2 =
−0.019) and short-term compensation (adjusted R2 = 0.098) explain little of the variation
of the two parts of CEO compensation. Again the models for long-term compensation
(adjusted R2 = 0.478) and total compensation (adjusted R2 = 0.520) explain more of
the variation in CEO compensation; however they are less powerful than the equivalent
models concerning the board structure (table 6.11). The fraction of insiders serving on
the compensation committee like before in the correlation analysis (table 6.10) shows no
significant coefficients. The percentage of insiders does not seem to have an influence
on any of the compensation measures. The model analyzing salary is not significant
at any conventional level, the short-term compensation model is significant at the p <
0.1 level whereas the models for long-term compensation and total compensation are
significant at the p < 0.01 level.The variable measuring compensation committee size
shows strong positive coefficients for long-term compensation (β = 0.116, p < 0.05) and
total compensation (β = 0.074, p < 0.05) supporting H-CC1, whereas the results salary
and short-term compensation lack significance. The variable measuring the percentage of
insiders on the compensation committee shows no significant results, hence hypothesis H-
CC2 is not supported. The same is true for both the percentage of gray directors6 and the
percentage of outsiders, no evidence for H-CC3 and H-CC4 was found in the data. The
multiple regression analysis supports HCC-5 for one compensation measure, a negative
coefficient was found for long-term compensation (β = −0.499, p < 0.05). The percentage
of the stock ownership of the compensation committee members like predicted shows
negative coefficients, however all of them lack significance. Company size has a positive
influence on all compensation measures, the coefficients for short-term compensation (β =
0.136, p < 0.01), long-term compensation (β = 0.517, p < 0.01), and total compensation
(β = 0.349, p < 0.01) are significant. Company performance seems to have a negative
impact on long-term compensation (β = −0.703, p < 0.1) and total compensation (β =
−0.564, p < 0.05).
6Again the models from table 6.13 were calculated excluding gray directors, however no significant dif-
ferences were found.
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coefficients and t-statistics
log salary log st log lt log T C
Intercept 5.083 (8.493) ∗∗∗ 4.747 (13.579) ∗∗∗ 3.202 (5.657) ∗∗∗ 4.225 (13.058) ∗∗∗
Compensation Committee Size 0.091 (1.450) 0.051 (1.408) 0.116 (1.983) ∗∗ 0.074 (2.200) ∗∗
%Insiders -0.144 (-0.238) 0.033 (0.093) -0.260 (-0.459) 0.023 (0.071)
%Gray 0.312 (0.587) 0.241 (0.775) -0.037 (-0.075) -0.010 (-0.034)
%Outsiders -0.,091 (-0.210) 0.063 (0.247) -0.294 (-0.726) -0.037 (-0.160)
Fraction of CC in AC 0.167 (0.821) 0.140 (1.181) -0.499 (-2.574) ∗∗ -0.145 (-1.316)
CC Stock -1.916 (-1.278) -1.199 (-1.369) -0.392 (-0.281) -0,869 (-1.072)
Company Size 0.054 (0.606) 0.136 (2.618) ∗∗∗ 0.517 (6.135) ∗∗∗ 0.349 (7.239) ∗∗∗
Company Performance -0.155 -0.291 (-1.245) -0,703 (-1.886) ∗ -0.564 (-2.610) ∗∗
n 105 105 104 105
Adjusted R2 -0.019 0.098 0.478 0.520
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ Significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Table 6.13: Compensation Committee Structure and CEO Compensation
7 Conclusions
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX 2002) and other regulations concerning board and com-
mittee structure require companies to adapt their boards e.g. to increase the representation
of outsiders, avoid insiders and affiliated directors and separate the role of CEO and chair-
man of the board. The objective of this study was to observe and explain the association
between CEO compensation and board structure, audit committee composition and com-
pensation committee characteristics respectively. The focus was set on publicly listed U.S.
companies a randomly drawn sample eventually generated 106 valid observations.
Like predicted board size was found to have a positive impact on total CEO compensa-
tion, for the other compensation measures it shows positive but insignificant results. The
results are in line with most of the recent corporate governance literature (e.g. Core et al.,
1999; Petra and Dorata, 2008). Corporate governance guidelines and academic research
(e.g. Hall and Murphy, 2003) often recommend the avoidance of placing insiders on a
company board as they are said to be influenced by the CEO or considered weak mon-
itors. However consistent with Core et al. (1999) a negative relationship between CEO
compensation and insider representation on the board was found, hence there seems to be
no reason to believe that insiders result in higher CEO compensation rather the opposite.
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) find that firms that do not comply with corporate
governance regulations, decreased CEO compensation contrary to complying firms, this
finding would imply that CEOs with boards consisting of a majority of insiders would
receive lower compensation like the results of this study suggest. It is also possible that
insiders know the task as well as the effort level of their CEO and hence avoid exces-
sive pay. Hypothesis 3 predicted a positive relationship between gray directors and CEO
compensation, however no evidence was found in support of this assumption.
Many authors argue that independent outsiders are vigilant and competent members
of corporate boards resulting in higher efficiency compared to executive directors (e.g.
Ryan and Wiggins, 2004; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). In contrast to corporate governance
guidelines and regulations (e.g. SOX) as well as the opinion of shareholder activists no
support that outsiders constitute a more effective board and result in lower CEO com-
pensation could be found. This result is consistent with prior work that was not able to
identify any significant relation between non-executive directors and CEO pay (Conyon
and Peck, 1998; Core et al., 1999). Similarly old outsiders are believed to be less effective
and having a positive effect on CEO compensation (Core et al., 1999), contrary to hy-
pothesis 5 no evidence was found that indicates that old directors are ineffective monitors.
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Neither the correlation analysis nor the multiple regression models were able to identify
a statistically significant relationship between the fraction of directors over 69 and CEO
compensation. Corporate governance guidelines propagate the exclusion of busy directors,
academic research finds negative effects on corporate performance (Fich and Shivdasani,
2006) and a positive effect on CEO compensation (Core et al., 1999). The correlation
analysis reveals that all coefficients across each compensation measure are positive and
significant. However the results do not hold in the multiple regression models, finding
little support for hypothesis H6. Possible explanations are high correlations with other
independent variables resulting in high variance inflation factors and tampering with sta-
tistical significance. Results for outsiders appointed by the CEO are similar. Even though
some authors (e.g. Daily et al., 1998) argue that CEO appointed outside directors might
be less independent than other outsiders no evidence of such a relationship is found. Hy-
pothesis H8 predicted a positive effect of CEO duality on CEO compensation, however in
accordance to the results of Conyon and Peck (1998) no evidence of relationship between
the combination of titles (CEO = CoB) and executive compensation was found. CEO
duality seems to have no impact on the amount or the structure of CEO compensation.
Contrary to hypothesis H9 that stated a positive association between CEO compensation
and CEO tenure there is no evidence found in the data, coefficients for tenure are nega-
tive and insignificant.Vafeas (2003) finds the same empirical association and argues that
CEOs that rotate more often might be rewarded for their flexibility. Similarly Anderson
and Bizjak were not able to find support that a CEO with long tenure was able to ma-
nipulate committees in order to extract advantages. In accordance to Adams, Hermalin
and Weisbach (2003) correlation analysis revealed that tenure and the percentage of out-
siders on the board correlate significantly negative. Hypothesis H10 predicted a negative
relationship between CEO stock ownership and CEO compensation, found some support
in the correlation analysis, where all components of CEO pay except for salary correlated
negatively with CEO stock ownership. Again regression analysis could not find any signifi-
cant association which could be due to mulicollinearity. The results are in accordance with
Vafeas (2003) and Core et al. (1999) who found an inverse association as well. Further-
more a positive association between company size and CEO compensation was predicted
and also found in the correlation analysis for all compensation measures but salary, the
results held in the regression models for long-term compensation and total compensation.
It seems that firm size, measured as the log of total revenues, has an impact particularly
on variable compensation variables and hence on total compensation but not on salary.
This might be explained by the different performance measures used in a compensation
function, variable compensation often depends on company performance. The results are
similar to those of Daily et al. (1998) who found positive and significant coefficients for
the ratio of contingent pay to total compensation and for total compensation.
The results concerning the audit committee structure resemble the findings of the board
as a whole. Like highlighted by Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) smaller audit committees
tend to be preferred since in regard of CEO compensation control mechanisms seem to be
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stronger when audit committees are not large. Concerning the representation of insiders
no evidence could be found that as a result of higher insider representation corporate
governance weakened or CEOs got entrenched since insiders seem to have a negative influ-
ence on all components of CEO compensation. One explanation based on the arguments of
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) might be that non-compliance to corporate governance
regulations, e.g. insiders on the audit committee, reinforces vigilance and strengthens con-
trol mechanism since these companies might be rigorously observed by shareholders and
regulators. The percentage of gray directors has a positive effect on CEO compensation,
all coefficients were positive, although only the association with short-term compensation
proved to be statistically significant. It might be easier for the CEO to exert influence
over gray directors without attracting attention since they are not as obviously connected
to the CEO as insiders. The percentage of outsiders shows the predicted signs, however
none of the coefficients being significant.
Compensation committee size proved to be positively connected to CEO compensation,
it might be that the board or committees eventually lose oversight and control and hence
weakened corporate governance structures lead to higher CEO compensation. No evi-
dence that insiders on the compensation committee behave opportunistically and favor
their CEO could be found. This might be due to corporate governance regulations as
well as concerns of being perceived as bad decision makers. The results equal those of
Vafeas (2003) who failed to establish a connection between the magnitude or structure of
CEO compensation and insider representation. However gray directors seem to have some
positive impact on CEO compensation, again maybe this is resulting from their seemingly
independence from the CEO that sometimes makes it hard to discover their relationship
with the company. Outsiders on the compensation committee seem to have no influence on
CEO compensation, being in accordance with prior literature (e.g. Anderson and Bizjak).
Simirlarly the results of Cyert et al. (2002) show negative and significant coefficients. Also
the director overlapping variable shows significant negative coefficients for long-term com-
pensation. Also the director overlapping variable shows significant negative coefficients
for long-term compensation and total compensation.
This study should not be however considered to be free of any limitations. First the
sample consists of 106 companies - with a bigger sample statistically more reliable re-
sults would be possible. Secondly this study focuses on structure variables as measures
for corporate governance mechanisms since they are visible and obtainable as opposed
to behavioral explanations that would be hard to verify for one has no access to board
rooms. Another problem is the earlier mentioned endogenity which makes analysis and in-
terpretation of results tough. Board and committee structures might have an influence on
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CEO compensation, however the CEO might exert power over his board and subsequently
design a board favoring the CEO, that in turn would grant the CEO higher compensa-
tion. Also it might be that influential factors are missing in the analysis because they are
unobservable or did not seem important for this kind of research question. Like stated by
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) the equilibrium interpretation has a broader focus, there
might be factors influencing the board measure as well as the CEO compensation measure
at the same time resulting in a spurious correlation between the two measures of interest.
It would be interesting to conduct this study with a much larger sample with addition
of a time series observation showing the evolution of CEO compensation as well as the
board and committee structures over five to ten years.
Another problem is that structure variables are not optimal proxies for human behavior,
here a study in the actual board room with interviews as the chosen research instrument
would shed light on decision making as well as on internal control mechanisms more
adequately.
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Appendix
In the following tables the definition of insiders, gray directors and outsiders by Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2001) are used in the calculations.
1 Descriptive Statistics
1.1 Distributions - Minimums, Maximums, Means and Medians
Board Characteristics
Minimum Maximum Average Median SD
Boardsize 4 15 8.64 8 0.2223
Percentage of Insiders 6.67 71.43 26.67 25 0.0132
Percentage of Gray Directors 0 54.55 5.87 0 0.0102
Percentage of Outsiders 9.09 92.31 62.47 63.64 0.0158
Percentage of old Outsiders 0 42.86 7.92 0 0.0095
Percentage of busy Outsiders 0 92.31 37.69 40 0.0204
Percentage of Outsiders CEO app. 0 92.31 44.85 44.44 0.0226
Table 1: Distributions - Minimums, Maximums, Means and Medians - Board Character-
istics
Committee Characteristics
AuditCommittee
Minimum Maximum Average Median SD
AC Size 2 6 3.63 3 0.0896
Percentage of Insiders 0 66.67 5.14 0 0.0123
Percentage of Gray Directors 0 50 3.15 0 0.0095
Percentage of Outsiders 16.67 100 86.78 100 0.0179
Table 2: Committee Characteristics - Audit Committee
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CompensationCommittee
Minimum Maximum Average Median SD
@# directors CC BM 2 8 3.56 3 0.1039
insiders CC BM P 0 66.67 5.34 0 0.0132
gray CC BM P 0 66.67 5.23 0 0.0141
outsiders CC BM P 0 100 85.53 100 0.0207
fraction of cc in ac 0 100 49.77 50 0.0309
CC stock in Percent 0.02 25.12 1.82 0.3 0.0043
Table 3: Committee Characteristics - Compensation Committee
1.2 Correlations
Correlation Analysis – Board of Directors
boardsize in gray out ind board old out busy out busy board out ceo log salary log st log lt
in corr. -.260 ∗∗
sig. 0.007
gray corr. 0.066 -.191 ∗
sig. 0.498 0.048
out corr. 0.155 -.651 ∗∗ -.437 ∗∗
sig. 0.111 0 0
ind board corr. 0.036 -.406 ∗∗ -.433 ∗∗ .749 ∗∗
sig. 0.714 0 0 0
old out corr. 0.072 0.071 -0.13 0.036 0.076
sig. 0.461 0.469 0.183 0.712 0.437
busy out corr. .318 ∗∗ -.503 ∗∗ -0.168 .581 ∗∗ .404 ∗∗ -.217 ∗
sig. 0.001 0 0.084 0 0 0.025
busyboard corr. .259 ∗∗ -.309 ∗∗ -0.175 .456 ∗∗ .313 ∗∗ -0.094 .746 ∗∗
sig. 0.007 0.001 0.072 0 0.001 0.338 0
out ceo corr. -0.137 -.307 ∗∗ -0.117 .418 ∗∗ .287 ∗∗ -0.011 0.149 0.147
sig. 0.159 0.001 0.228 0 0.003 0.911 0.125 0.13
log salary corr. 0.154 -0.16 0.021 0.101 -0.04 0.076 0.172 0.151 -0.021
sig. 0.114 0.1 0.834 0.301 0.685 0.438 0.077 0.121 0.829
log st corr. .331 ∗∗ -.209 ∗ .224 ∗ 0.054 -0.068 0.014 0.187 0.139 -0.037 .831 ∗∗
sig. 0.001 0.031 0.02 0.583 0.487 0.889 0.054 0.154 0.702 0
log lt corr. .545 ∗∗ -.412 ∗∗ 0.056 .285 ∗∗ 0.153 -0.041 .422 ∗∗ .274 ∗∗ -0.086 .335 ∗∗ .387 ∗∗
sig. 0 0 0.566 0.003 0.118 0.679 0 0.004 0.381 0 0
log T C corr. .605 ∗∗ -.362 ∗∗ 0.085 .274 ∗∗ 0.113 -0.001 .404 ∗∗ .326 ∗∗ -0.1 .454 ∗∗ .629 ∗∗ .885 ∗∗
sig. 0 0 0.383 0.004 0.246 0.992 0 0.001 0.308 0 0 0
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ Significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Table 4: Correlation Analysis - Board of Directors analysis
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Correlation Analysis - Committees
CorrelationAnalysisAuditCommittee
ac size in ac gray ac out ac log salary log st log lt
in ac corr. 0.165
sig. 0.09
gray ac corr. -0.022 0.016
sig. 0.825 0.868
out ac corr. -0.038 -.584 ∗∗ -.474 ∗∗
sig. 0.699 0 0
log salary corr. .231 ∗ -.220 ∗ 0.085 0.094
sig. 0.017 0.023 0.384 0.337
log st corr. .258 ∗∗ -0.121 .262 ∗∗ -0.024 .831 ∗∗
sig. 0.007 0.214 0.006 0.804 0
log lt corr. .505 ∗∗ 0.021 0.071 -0.028 .335 ∗∗ .387 ∗∗
sig. 0 0.832 0.471 0.775 0 0
log T C corr. .544 ∗∗ 0.018 0.108 -0.004 .454 ∗∗ .629 ∗∗ .885∗∗
sig. 0 0.854 0.27 0.969 0 0 0
∗∗, ∗ Significant at the 0.01, 0.05, respectively.
Table 5: Correlation Analysis - Audit Committee Analysis
CorrelationAnalysis − CompensationCommittee
cc size in cc gray cc out cc over- fraction CC stock log salary log st log lt
lapping cc/ac
in cc corr. -0.021
sig. 0.828
gray cc corr. 0.005 -0.013
sig. 0.958 0.892
out cc corr. 0.006 -.594 ∗∗ -.450 ∗∗
sig. 0.953 0 0
overlapping corr. .312 ∗∗ -0.052 0.045 0.012
sig. 0.001 0.595 0.643 0.902
fraction cc/ac corr. -0.155 -0.067 0.012 0.025 .851 ∗∗
sig. 0.112 0.495 0.905 0.795 0
CC stock corr. 0.052 -0.025 .276 ∗∗ -0.146 .217 ∗ 0.163
sig. 0.597 0.798 0.004 0.134 0.025 0.094
log salary corr. 0.169 0.024 0.022 -0.022 0.072 0.016 -0.107
sig. 0.083 0.803 0.826 0.825 0.46 0.87 0.273
log st corr. .240 ∗ 0.01 0.058 0.02 0.071 -0.025 -0.161 .831∗∗
sig. 0.013 0.918 0.553 0.841 0.468 0.8 0.098 0
log lt corr. .403 ∗∗ 0.078 0.028 -0.024 -0.183 -.420 ∗∗ -0.156 .335 ∗∗ .387 ∗∗
sig. 0 0.427 0.774 0.807 0.06 0 0.11 0 0
log T C corr. .421 ∗∗ 0.089 0.001 0.01 -0.13 -.334 ∗∗ -.218 ∗ .454 ∗∗ .629 ∗∗ .885 ∗∗
sig. 0 0.364 0.992 0.916 0.181 0 0.024 0 0 0
∗∗, ∗ Significant at the 0.01, 0.05 levels, respectively.
Table 6: Correlation Analysis - Compensation Committee Analysis
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2 Regression Analysis
2.1 Board of Directors Structure and CEO Compensation
Log Compensation =
α+ β1BoardSize+ β2%Insiders+ β3%GrayDirectors+
β4%Outsiders+ β5%OldOutsiders+ β6%Busy Outsiders+
β7%OutsidersCEO appointed+ β8GenderDummy + β9CEOAge+
β10Tenure+ β11CEOChair Dummy + β12CEOStock+
β13Company Size+ β14Company Performance
coefficients and t-statistics
log salary log st log lt log T C
Intercept 5.373 (5.660) ∗∗∗ 4.972 (9.117) ∗∗∗ 4.387 (5.272) ∗∗∗ 4.826 (10.461) ∗∗∗
Board Size -0.001 (-0.017) 0.022 (1.006) 0.029 (0.897) 0.034 (1.852) ∗
%Insiders -0.656 (-0.709) -0.106 (-0.200) -2.523 (-3.081) ∗∗∗ -0.914 (-2.033) ∗∗
%Gray Directors -0.235 (-0.226) 0.734 (1.227) -1.493 (-1.640) -0.329 (-0.649)
%Outsiders -0.406 (-0.441) -0.072 (-0.137) -1.173 (-1.449) -0.333 (-0.744)
%Old Outsiders 0.703 (1.009) 0.246 (0.616) 0.263 (0.440) 0.342 (1.009)
% Busy Outsiders 0.476 (1.155) 0.217 (0.919) 0.366 (1.033) 0.231 (1.152)
%Outsiders CEO appointed -0.038 (-0.108) 0.048 (0.239) -0.156 (-0.517) -0.056 (-0.326)
Female 0.121 (0.361) -0.009 (-0.045) 0.043 (0.148) -0.013 (-0.078)
CEO Age 0.005 (0.607) 0.,002 (0.438) -0.001 (-0.095) -0.002 (-0.415)
CEO Tenure -0.002 (-0.116) -0.002 (-0.200) -0.019 (-1.627) -0.012 (-1.777) ∗
CEO Chair -0.098 (-0.704) -0.016 (-0.204) 0.091 (0.767) 0.070 (1.042)
CEO Stock -0.059 (-0.104) -0.246 (-0.750) -0.196 (-0.398) -0.267 (-0.960)
Company Size 0.061 (0.597) 0.087 (1.495) 0.519 (5.969) ∗∗∗ 0.313 (6.358) ∗∗∗
Company Performance -0.237 (-0.586) -0.264 (-1.136) -0.836 (-2.411) ∗∗ -0.587 (-2.985) ∗∗∗
n 105 105 104 105
Adjusted R2 -0.065 0.088 0.536 0.594
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ Significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Table 7: Regression Analysis - Board of Directors Structure and CEO Compensation
2.2 Regression Analysis - Committees
Regression Analysis - Audit Committee Structure and CEO Compensation
Log Compensation =
α+ β1AuditCommittee Size+ β2%Insiders+
β3%GrayDirectors+ β4%Outsiders+
β5Company Size+ β6Company Performance
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coefficients and t-statistics
log salary log st log lt log T C
Intercept 4.910 (8.805) ∗∗∗ 4.834 (14.832) ∗∗∗ 2.348 (4.254) ∗∗∗ 3.845 (13.006) ∗∗∗
Audit Committee Size 0.164 (2.369) ∗∗ 0.072 (1.767) ∗ 0.237 (3.577) ∗∗∗ 0.158 (4.306) ∗∗∗
%Insiders -1.401 (-2.285) ∗∗ -0.641 (-1.788) ∗ -1.078 (-1.819) ∗ -0.606 (-1.865) ∗
%Gray Directors 0.451 (0.622) 0.870 (2.053) ∗∗ -0.241 (-0.344) 0.121 (0.316)
%Outsiders -0.094 (-0.200) -0.035 (-0.128) -0.322 (-0.703) -0.068 (-0.273)
Company Size 0.057 (0.725) 0.134 (2.916) ∗∗∗ 0.557 (7.346) ∗∗∗ 0.356 (8.529) ∗∗∗
Company Performance -0.175 (-0.476) -0.291 (-1.356) -0.895 (-2.549) ∗∗ -0.649 (-3.337) ∗∗∗
n 105 105 104 105
Adjusted R2 0.083 0.187 0.501 0.584
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ Significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Table 8: Regression Analysis - Audit Committee Structure and CEO Compensation
Regression Analysis - Compensation Committee Structure and CEO
Compensation
Log Compensation = α+ β1CompensationCommittee Size+
β2CC Stock + β3%Insiders+ β4%GrayDirectors+
β5%Outsiders+ β6Fraction of CC inAC+
β7Company Size+ β8Company Performance
coefficients and t-statistics
log salary log st log lt log T C
Intercept 5.030 (8.351) ∗∗∗ 4.739 (13.501) ∗∗∗ 3.155 (5.553) ∗∗∗ 4.208 (12.989) ∗∗∗
Compensation Committee Size 0.091 (1.449) 0.052 (1.420) 0.115 (1.963) ∗ 0.074 (2.184) ∗∗
%Insiders 0.064 (0.105) 0.052 (0.145) -0.041 (-0.073) 0.116 (0.352)
%Gray 0.173 (0.327) 0.232 (0.751) -0.219 (-0.447) -0.112 (-0.394)
%Outsiders -0.048 (-0.112) 0.068 (0.270) -0.261 (-0.647) -0.031 (-0.134)
Fraction of CC in AC 0.170 (0.834) 0.141 (1.185) -0.496 (-2.556) ∗∗ -0.143 (-1.301)
CC Stock -1.741 (-1.159) -1,186 (-1.355) -0.177 (-0.127) -0.760 (-0.941)
Company Size 0.055 (0.618) 0.136 (2.621) ∗∗∗ 0.519 (6.173) ∗∗∗ 0.351 (7.307) ∗∗∗
Company Performance -0.145 (-0.362) -0.289 (-1.237) -0.696 (-1.867) ∗ -0.563 (-2.612) ∗∗∗
n 105 105 104 105
Adjusted R2 -0.024 0.097 0.477 0.522
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ Significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
Table 9: Regression Analysis - Compensation Committee Structure and CEO Compensa-
tion
Eidesstattliche Erkla¨rung
Ich versichere, dass ich meine Diplomarbeit ohne Hilfe Dritter und ohne Benutzung anderer
als der angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel angefertigt und die den benutzten Quellen
wo¨rtlich oder inhaltlich entnommenen Stellen als solche kenntlich gemacht habe. Diese
Arbeit hat in gleicher oder a¨hnlicher Form noch keiner Pru¨fungsbeho¨rde vorgelegen.
Wien, October 11, 2011 Silvia Cindric
Abstracts
Corporate scandals (e.g. Enron, WorldCom) have evoked outrage in the public as well
as in shareholders and regulators. Managers with insider information extracted enormous
amounts of money by betraying both their company and their shareholders. Three eco-
nomic actors were to blame first the executives, second the auditor and third and most
importantly the board of directors. In reaction to these corporate scandals new regulations
concerning corporate governance emerged (e.g. SOX 2002, NYSE Corporate Governance
Regulations). Shareholder activists as well as institutional investors demand their repre-
sentatives within the corporation which are responsible for protecting shareholder interests
namely the board of directors to be structured and act in compliance with corporate gov-
ernance regulations. This issue similarly attracted the interest of academics as the growing
amount of academic literature dealing with executive compensation, the board of direc-
tors or the various committees shows. Theoretical assumptions are mostly in accordance
with corporate governance regulations however empirical findings are inconclusive. The
aim of this work is to investigate the relationship between the board of directors and its
subordinate audit and compensation committee with CEO compensation. First academic
literature agency theoretic assumptions about CEO compensation are discussed, followed
by alternative approaches (e.g. human capital theory, stewardship theory). In the next
section the board of directors as well as the audit and the compensation committee are
analyzed and hypotheses about the association with CEO compensation are developed
and subsequently tested in the empirical part of this study. Positive coefficients were
found for company size, board size, audit committee size, gray directors serving on the
audit committee, and compensation committee size. Negative coefficients were found for
percentage of insiders on the company board, company performance measured as ROA,
the percentage of insiders serving on the audit committee and director overlap between
compensation committee and audit committee.
Key words: Agency Theory, CEO compensation, board of directors, audit committee,
compensation committee, managerial entrenchment, insiders, outsiders, gray directors,
corporate governance, chairman of the board
Bilanzskandale (z.B. Enron, WorldCom) haben Empo¨rung in der O¨ffentlichkeit als bei
den Aktiona¨ren und den Regulierungsbeho¨rden hervorgerufen. Manager mit Insiderin-
formationen extrahierten durch den Verrat ihres Unternehmens als auch ihrer Aktiona¨re
enorme Reichtu¨mer. Drei wirtschaftliche Akteure wurden als die Hauptschuldigen iden-
tifiziert: das Managment, der Auditor und das Board of Directors (der Aufsichtsrat).
In Reaktion auf diese Skandale sind weltweit Unmengen an neuen Corporate Gover-
nance Regulierungen entstanden (zB SOX 2002, NYSE Corporate Governance Regula-
tions). Shareholder als auch institutionelle Investoren fordern dass deren Vertreter in-
nerhalb des Unternehmens, der Aufsichtsrat, welcher die Aufgabe hat die Aktiona¨rsin-
teressen zu schu¨tzen, sowohl nach diesen Corporate Governance Vorschriften handelt als
auch dementsprechend strukturiert ist. Auch das rege Interesse von Wissenschaftlern
wurde geweckt, wie anhand der wachsende Menge an wissenschaftlichen Literatur u¨ber
die Vergu¨tung von Fu¨hrungskra¨ften, das Board of Directors oder die verschiedenen Sub-
kommittees ersichtlich ist. Theoretische Annahmen sind gro¨ßtenteils im Einklang mit
Corporate Governance-Vorschriften, die empirischen Ergebnisse divergieren jedoch und
erlauben kein einheitliches Bild. Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, die Beziehung zwischen dem
Board of Directors, seiner Subkommittees (Audit und Compensation Committee) und der
CEO Vergu¨tung zu untersuchen. Zuerst wird ein U¨berblick u¨ber theoretische Annahmen
bezu¨glich Vorstandsgeha¨lter gegeben, gefolgt von alternativen Ansa¨tzen (z.B.: Human
Capital Theorie, Stewardship Theorie). Im na¨chsten Abschnitt werden das Board of Di-
rectors als auch das Audit und Compensation Committee analysiert. In diesem Abschnitt
werden auch Hypothesen u¨ber den Einluss dieser Strukturvariablen auf CEO Vergu¨tung
entwickelt und anschließend in dem empirischen Teil der Studie getestet. Positive Koef-
fizienten wurden fu¨r Firmengro¨ße, Aufsichtsratgro¨ße, Audit Committee Gro¨ße, den Anteil
der verbundenen Direktoren (z.B. zugeho¨rige Unternehmensberater) als Mitglieder des
Audit Committees und Compensation Committee Gro¨ße gefunden. Negative Koeffizien-
ten wurden fu¨r den Prozentsatz von Insidern im Aufsichtsrat, ROA, den Prozentsatz der
Insiders im Audit Committee und fu¨r die Mitglieder U¨berschneidungen zwischen Audit
Committee und Compensation Committee gefunden.
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